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“Detailed conditionality (often including dozens of conditions) has burdened
IMF programs in recent years and made such programs unwieldy, highly con-
ﬂictive, time consuming to negotiate, and often ineﬀectual.”
“The IMF [International Monetary Fund] should cease lending to countries
for long-term development assistance (as in sub-Saharan Africa) and for long-
term structural transformation (as in post-Communist transition
economies)....  T h e  current practice of extending long-term loans in exchange
for member countries’ agreeing to conditions set by the IMF should end.”
—Meltzer Report (International Financial Institution Advisory Commission
2000, 7, 8, and 43)
“Both the Fund and the Bank have tried to do too much in recent years, and
they have lost sight of their respective strengths. They both need to return to
basics . . . [The Fund] should focus on a leaner agenda of monetary, ﬁscal, and
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reform.”
—Council on Foreign Relations Task Force (1999, 18–19)
“The one common theme that runs through perceptions of ESAF [Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility] at the country level is a feeling of a loss of control
over the policy content and the pace of implementation of reform programs.”1
—External Evaluation of the ESAF (Botchway et al. 1998, 20)
“The IMF should eschew the temptation to use currency crises as an opportu-
nity to force fundamental structural and institutional reforms on countries,
however useful they may be in the long term, unless they are absolutely neces-
sary to revive access to international funds.”
—Martin Feldstein (1998, 32)
“The IMF’s activities are not related to those speciﬁed in its charter for the
simple reason that the par-value system of exchange rates it was to monitor no
longer exists. In the tradition of skilled bureaucracies, the IMF has turned to
new areas and has managed to expand substantially its ﬁnancial resources and,
in the process, its inﬂuence.”
—George Shultz (1995, 5)
“The IMF has not been established to give guidance on social and political pri-
orities, nor has its voting system been designed to give it the moral authority to
oversee priorities of a noneconomic nature. Its functions have to be kept nar-
rowly technical . . . and the Fund has to accept that the authorities of a country
are the sole judges of its social and political priorities.”
—David Finch (1983, 77–78)2
“The IMF programs in East Asia are far from optimal for restoring ﬁnancial
market conﬁdence in the short term....   [T]hey have covered a very wide range
of policies beyond the immediate ﬁnancial crisis....   Most of the structural re-
forms, however, simply detract attention from the ﬁnancial crisis. They have
taken government expertise, negotiating time, and political capital away from
the core issues of ﬁnancial markets, exchange rate policy, and the like.”
—Steven Radelet and Jeﬀrey D. Sachs (1998, 67–68)
“In view of the size of the current deﬁcits and the diﬃculties that may arise in
private intermediation, the Fund must be prepared, when necessary, to lend in
larger amounts than in the past. Also, the structural problems faced by many
countries may require that adjustment take place over a longer period than has
been typical in the framework of Fund programs in the past.”
—International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook (1980)
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1. ESAF is the Fund’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, established in 1987 to pro-
vide long-term concessional assistance to low-income countries facing protracted balance-of-
payments problems.
2. Mr. Finch was then the director of the IMF’s Exchange and Trade Relations Department.“The Fund approach to adjustment has had severe economic costs for many
of these [developing] countries in terms of declines in the levels of output and
growth rates, reductions in employment and adverse eﬀects on income distri-
bution.”
—Report by the Group of Twenty-Four (1987, 9)
“Our prime objective is growth. In my view, there is no longer any ambiguity
about this. It is towards growth that our programs and their conditionality are
aimed.”
“Only the pursuit of ‘high-quality’ growth is worth the eﬀort. What is such
growth? It is growth that can be sustained over time without causing domestic
and external ﬁnancial imbalance; growth that has the human person at its cen-
ter . . . growth that, to be sustainable, is based on a continuous eﬀort for more
equity, poverty alleviation, and empowerment of poor people; and growth that
promotes protection of the environment, and respect for national cultural val-
ues. This is what our programs are, more and more, and must aim for.”
—From speeches by former IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus (1990,
2000a, respectively)
“In recent years, some critics of the IMF have gone to the opposite extreme, ar-
guing that the IFIs [international ﬁnancial institutions] should have done more,
especially in the context of the economies in transition to develop an appropri-
ate framework of property rights in support of markets....   [I]n considering the
future of the two institutions, their activities need to be geared to strengthening
the private sector and the appropriate role of government in relation to it.”
—Anne O. Krueger (1998, 2003)
“I do not accept the view that when it comes to our poorer member countries,
we should not be lending to them, but should turn it over to someone else....
Is the poverty reduction and growth facility . . . which we are working on jointly
with the World Bank . . . going to be an improvement in the way we deal with
countries? Absolutely. Why? Because . . . it forces us, in cooperation with the
World Bank, to make sure that the macroeconomic framework is consistent
with what needs to be done for social reasons. Macroeconomic instability is
bad for everyone everywhere....  T h a t  i s  w h y  w e  should remain in these coun-
tries....   But we cannot do that in a way that ignores the fact that poverty is the
main problem confronting these countries, and that there must be massive
eﬀorts, spearheaded by the World Bank, to reduce poverty in these countries.”
—Stanley Fischer, IMF ﬁrst deputy managing director (2000b)
“A changed IMF is needed for the changed world we now have....  A s  w e  l o o k
to the future we need to redouble our eﬀorts to ﬁnd better approaches if not an-
swers to fundamental questions....  H o w  d o  w e  balance concerns about intru-
siveness in national aﬀairs and a desire to promote national ownership of re-
form programs with a desire to see governments take bolder steps to, for
example, build stronger social safety nets, implement core labor standards, em-
IMF Structural Programs 365power civil society groups, reduce the role of government in the economy, and
address critical issues related to governance, corruption, and crony capitalism?”
—U.S. Treasury Secretary Summers (1999)
“[T]he proposed eligibility criteria [for IMF lending in the Meltzer Report] are
too narrow. Even where they are met, they would be unlikely to protect
economies from the broad range of potential causes of crises. The criteria focus
on the ﬁnancial sector, and yet even problems that surface in the ﬁnancial sector
often have their roots in deeper economic and structural weaknesses. One
simply cannot predict with conﬁdence what the next generation of crises will be
and therefore we need to preserve the IMF’s ability to respond ﬂexibly to
changingcircumstances.”
—U.S. Treasury Response to the Meltzer Report (2000b, 17)
“A central part of the programs in the Asian crisis countries was an unprece-
dented body of structural reforms....  T h e  o v erriding question is whether it
wasa ppropriate to place so much emphasis on structural reform measures in
the ﬁnancial and corporate sectors....  T h e  a n s w e r  i s  c l e a r l y  y e s . ”
—IMF Report (Lane et al. 1999) on Fund Programs in Indonesia, Korea, and
Thailand
“[T]he bottom line of the ‘era of the IFIs,’ despite obvious shortcomings, has
been an unambiguous success of historic proportions in both economic and
social terms.”
—Minority Dissent, Meltzer Report (Bergsten et al. 2000, 111)
As suggested above, an active debate has long been under way—and has
intensiﬁed in the wake of the Asian crisis—about the appropriate scope and
intrusiveness of IMF policy conditionality. In this paper, I take up one key
element of that debate, namely, the role of structural policies in IMF-
supported adjustment programs. By “structural policies,” I mean policies
aimed not at the management of aggregate demand but rather at either
improving the eﬃciency of resource use or increasing the economy’s pro-
ductive capacity. Structural policies are usually aimed at reducing or dis-
mantling government-imposed distortions or putting in place various
institutional features of a modern market economy. Such structural policies
include, inter alia, ﬁnancial-sector policies; liberalization of trade, capital
markets, and the exchange rate system; privatization and public enterprise
policies; tax and expenditure policies (apart from the overall ﬁscal stance);
labor-market policies; pricing and marketing policies; transparency and
disclosure policies; poverty reduction and social safety-net policies; pen-
sion policies; corporate governance policies (including anticorruption mea-
sures); and environmental policies.
To set the stage for what follows, it is worth summarizing the main con-
cerns and criticisms that have been expressed about the IMF’s existing ap-
366 Morris Goldsteinproach to structural policy conditionality.3These typically take one or more
of the following forms.
First, there is a worry that wide-ranging and micromanaged structural
policy recommendations will be viewed by developing-country borrowers
as so costly and intrusive as to discourage unduly the demand for Fund as-
sistance during crises (see, e.g., Feldstein 1998). Even though the cost of
borrowing from the Fund (the so-called rate of charge) is much lower than
the cost of borrowing from private creditors—particularly during times of
stress—we observe that developing countries usually come to the IMF “late
in the day” when their balance-of-payments problems are already severe.4
This suggests that developing countries place a nontrivial shadow price on
the policy conditions associated with Fund borrowing. The concern is that
if these conditions become too onerous, emerging economies will wait even
longer to come to the Fund (as Thailand did in 1997) or will turn to regional
oﬃcial crisis lenders that oﬀer easier policy conditionality (e.g., in 1998
Malaysia was one of the ﬁrst beneﬁciaries of low-conditionality Miyazawa
Initiative funds, and Asian countries could eventually decide to elevate the
infant Chiang-Mai swap arrangements into a full-ﬂedged Asian Monetary
Fund).5 The outcome—so the argument goes—would then be even more
diﬃcult initial crisis conditions, greater resort to the antisocial behavior
that the Fund was established to prevent, and a tendency toward Gresham’s
Law of conditionality (according to which weak regional conditionality
would drive out not only the unnecessary but also the necessary elements of
Fund conditionality).
A second concern is that insistence on deep structural reforms in cases of
illiquidity (rather than insolvency) will serve only to frighten private in-
vestors about the size of the problem, thereby rendering more diﬃcult the
restoration of conﬁdence and the rollover of short-term capital ﬂows that
are the keys to resolving the liquidity crisis (see Radelet and Sachs 1998).
No country (including the Group of Seven [G7] countries) is without some
structural weaknesses, but it is argued that, however desirable structural
policy reforms may be for the performance of the economy over the longer
term, it is a mistake to suggest that such reforms are indispensable to re-
solving the crisis (when they are not). Among the Asian crisis countries,
Korea is identiﬁed as a case in which solvency was never in question and less
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3. Neither these concerns and criticisms, nor the counterarguments outlined later in this sec-
tion, should be interpreted as my own views. I provide my own summary assessment of past
fund structural conditionality in section 5.1.4.
4. The Fund’s rate of charge averaged a little over 4 percent from 1997 through the ﬁrst half
of 2000; in contrast, emerging market bond spreads (relative to U.S. Treasuries) have ﬂuctu-
ated from 375 to 1,700 basis points since the outbreak of the Thai crisis in mid-1997.
5. See C. Fred Bergsten’s “Towards a Tripartite World” (The Economist, 15 July 2000, 23–
26) on regional ﬁnancial initiatives in Asia.emphasis on structural reform both in the diagnosis and the policy pre-
scription would have produced a milder crisis.
Concern number three is with equal treatment of countries—one of the
Fund’s key operating principles. Here, the argument is that the Fund has
been asking for sweeping structural reforms from developing countries that
it would not ask of industrial countries were the latter in similar circum-
stances. As Paul Volcker put it, “When the Fund consults with a poor and
weak country, the country gets in line. When it consults with a big and
strong country, the Fund gets in line” (Volcker and Gyohten 1992). Al-
though diﬀerences across countries in economic and political power are a
fact of life, the argument is that requiring developing countries to undertake
more structural remedies than would their industrial-country counterparts
undermines local “ownership” of Fund programs. It also works at cross
purposes from simultaneous eﬀorts to forge a consensus on strengthening
the international financial architecture in (mixed developing-country and
industrial-country) groups like the Group of Twenty (G20) and the Finan-
cial Stability Forum (FSF).
Yet a fourth criticism is that permitting the Fund to stray from its core
competence of macroeconomic and exchange rate policies into a host of
structural policy areas results in poor crisis management, weakens the
Fund’s overall reputation for competent analysis and advice (with adverse
spillovers for the credibility of its recommendations in core policy areas),
and runs counter to a sensible division of labor and an application of com-
parative advantage among the various international financial institutions
(IFIs). In this connection, critics have maintained that the Fund bungled
bank closures in Indonesia and precipitated a credit crunch in the crisis
countries by requiring an unduly rapid increase in bank capitalization (see,
e.g., Stiglitz 1999); that the Fund lacks both the expertise and staﬀresources
to make timely and sound policy recommendations in areas as diverse as cor-
porate governance, trade policy, privatization, poverty reduction, and envi-
ronmental management; and that “mission creep” on the part of both the
Fund and the World Bank, in addition to a blurring of responsibilities be-
tween them, reduces the public and legislative support necessary to fund
them adequately (see Council on Foreign Relations Task Force 1999). Long-
term structural reforms (at least outside the ﬁnancial sector) and poverty re-
duction should be the main business of the World Bank—not of the IMF.
A ﬁfth charge is that the way the Fund has been managing its structural
policy conditionality is ﬂawed. Speciﬁcally, the argument is that multiplica-
tion of structural performance conditions, the speciﬁcation of “micro” pol-
icy measures, and the increasing reliance on (qualitative) structural bench-
marks and program reviews (as monitors of policy performance) have
combined both to increase the uncertainty facing Fund borrowers and to
lower the incentive to follow through with structural reform. Performance
criteria were instituted not only to assure the Fund that its financial re-
368 Morris Goldsteinsources were being used for the purposes intended but also to assure the
borrowing country that if it undertook certain prespeciﬁed policy actions it
would be eligible to draw (see Guitian 1981; Polak 1991). Also, because per-
formance criteria were relatively few in number, easily measured, and
macro in their impact, they both conveyed a relatively clear message about
which policy actions were deemed (by the Fund) to carry the highest prior-
ity and provided a fairly predictable link with bottom-line economic out-
comes (e.g., improvement in the balance of payments). However, when a
Fund program contains, say, on the order of ﬁfty or more qualitative struc-
tural policy conditions, when many of these conditions are very micro in na-
ture, and when both fulﬁllment of these conditions and eligibility to draw
require judgmental calls by the Fund, signals, impacts, and incentives will
be more muddled. Should meeting thirty of fifty structural policy condi-
tions be interpreted as a “good overall eﬀort” that merits Fund support, or
should it be viewed as a signiﬁcant noncompliance with the program?
Suﬃce to say that these criticisms of the Fund’s structural policy condi-
tionality have not gone unchallenged. Again, in the spirit of motivating the
subsequent discussion, it is well to consider the following counterargu-
ments.
Although the structural policy conditions the IMF attaches to its loans
are often demanding and threaten vested interests within the country,
emerging economies recognize that a Fund program represents their best
chance to make real traction on the structural weaknesses that have under-
pinned their crisis vulnerability. Private capital markets, although they
sometimes supply strong disciplining force, are not perfect substitutes for
either the Fund’s speciﬁc policy advice or its ﬁnancing; indeed, in more than
a few cases, private creditors will not extend credit in large amounts until
the Fund has blessed a country’s policies.6Turning the steering wheel over
temporarily to an outside party is always costly, but better the Fund than
one or two large G7 countries. Ironically, the structural policy measures
that have drawn the most critical ﬁre in several of the Asian crisis countries
(Indonesia and Korea) were for a long time high on the priority list of do-
mestic reformers, but they could not get those reforms implemented (over
the opposition of the ruling elite) in a noncrisis situation.7 At this point,
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6. Fischer (2000b, 1) argues that the fundamental reason why one needs an institution like
the IMF is that “the international ﬁnancial system left to itself does not work perfectly, and it
is possible to make it work better for the sake of the people who live in that system.” Also, see
Masson and Mussa (1995) and Krueger (1998). Rodrik (1995) notes that an experiment in
which private creditors attempted to specify and monitor conditionality in Peru was soon dis-
continued.
7. See Haggard (2000). On the role of domestic reformers in the Asian crisis countries, he
concludes as follows: “it is misguided to see the course of policy solely as a response to exter-
nal political pressures from the international ﬁnancial institutions and the United States....
At least in some important policy areas, domestic groups were reaching surprisingly similar
conclusions on the need for reform” (12).there is no plan to turn Asian swap or credit arrangements into a serious ri-
val to the Fund with competing policy conditionality. Also, very few crisis
countries (in Asia or elsewhere) have seen capital controls as the preferred
mode of crisis management. Just as it is not optimal for a host country to
establish the weakest regulatory and prudential regime simply because it
gives market participants the most freedom of action, it is not optimal
(from the viewpoint of developing countries) to make Fund structural pol-
icy conditionality too easy or ﬂexible. Fund gaiatsu—warts and all—may
still be the best option out there for jump-starting structural reform.
The distinction between illiquidity and insolvency is not regarded as par-
ticularly helpful in most crisis situations, because the dividing line between
the two often rests on the quality of crisis management, and because coun-
tries diﬀer from ﬁrms both in the nature of the relevant collateral and in
their willingness (as opposed to ability) to pay (see Fischer 1999). Although
investor panic was an important part of the Asian crisis story, so too were
“bad fundamentals” that increased downside risk. For example, in the run-
up to the Korean crisis, seven of the thirty largest chaebol were essentially
bankrupt; there were large terms-of-trade losses in 1996 (especially for
semiconductors); nonperforming loans in the banking system and leverage
in the corporate sector were already high; there was a low return on invested
capital; capital inﬂows were biased toward short-term capital and against
foreign direct investment; there was a lack of transparency (including on the
country’s short-term foreign liabilities); and substantial political uncer-
tainty exacerbated the government’s credibility problem.8 Yes,  many of
these structural problems were of long standing, and despite them Korea
had shown impressive growth performance over several decades. And yes,
Korea has staged an impressive V-shaped recovery without eliminating all
these structural problems. Nevertheless, it does not follow that Korea could
have regained market conﬁdence without making a good “start” on struc-
tural reform in 1997–98. Fund ﬁnancing–cum–debt rescheduling and an
(eventual) turn to easier monetary and ﬁscal policies—without any struc-
tural policy reform—would not have turned the situation around. Treating
only the symptoms and not the (structural) root of the problem is not the
way to restore conﬁdence. Looking at precrisis ﬁscal positions in the crisis
countries without considering the contingent government liabilities asso-
ciated with ﬁnancial-sector restructuring provides a misleading picture
of fundamentals (see Boorman et al. 2000). Moreover, the alleged negative
eﬀect of Fund public pronouncements on market conﬁdence is said to be
much exaggerated. Once Thailand’s fall “woke up” market participants to
the poor health of banks and corporates in the rest of Asia and every large
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8. See Roubini’s comments in McHale (2000b). Claessens et al. (1999) also found that (pre-
crisis) the four countries most seriously aﬀected by the Asian crisis ranked low on the quality
of the regulatory environment in an international comparison of middle-income emerging
economies in East Asia and Latin America.Group of Ten (G10) bank and security house in the region was issuing
weekly reports on the rising share of nonperforming loans in Asian ﬁnan-
cial systems, it is very unlikely that a Fund statement claiming it was only a
short-term liquidity crisis would have turned the tide (after all, the IMF’s
then managing director was already telling all who would listen that the cri-
sis was really “a blessing in disguise”).9
Reﬂecting, inter alia, their less preferred access (in terms of maturity,
currency, and predictability) to international capital markets, their weaker
institutional framework (ranging from judicial systems to insolvency
regimes), and their track record of higher political instability, developing
countries are diﬀerent from industrial countries. Recognizing this diﬀer-
ence is not dispensing unequal treatment but seeing the world as it is. If the
Asian crisis countries—despite their impressive performance on economic
growth, inﬂation, and macro fundamentals over a long period—were re-
garded by private ﬁnancial markets as being just like industrial countries,
they could have “done an Australia” and got out of the crisis by lowering
interest rates and letting their exchange rates depreciate moderately—and
this without any Fund assistance.10In the event, they could not do that. Nor
will the crisis countries be able to sustain their recoveries if they lapse back
into the same structural weaknesses they had before. Consequently, it is not
realistic to expect a developing country that gets into a crisis to live by the
same structural policy conditionality as would a troubled industrial coun-
try.11 For the foreseeable future, developing countries will have to contend
with a history of banking, debt, and currency crises, and restoration of con-
ﬁdence will often require a diﬀerent dose and mix of macroeconomic and
structural policies than would be the case for industrial countries. There is
no indication that disagreement over past Fund structural policy condi-
tionality is hampering the work of groups like the G20 and the FSF; on the
contrary, those groups are making real progress in areas like the application
of international ﬁnancial standards.
The IMF has developed considerable expertise in dealing with banking
and ﬁnancial-sector problems in developing countries. Over the past ﬁve
years, more than forty-ﬁve specialists (including former bank supervisors)
have been added to the staﬀ of the Fund’s Monetary and Exchange Aﬀairs
Department alone. Admittedly, bank closures in Indonesia did not go well.
However, since deposit insurance arrangements were not in place, since the
authorities were willing to close only a small share of the insolvent banks,
and since there were concerns about the moral hazard eﬀects of a blanket
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9. See Goldstein (1998) and Ahluwalia (2000) on the “wake up” hypothesis as an explana-
tion of the contagion in the Asian crisis.
10. See Krugman (1998) on what the “conﬁdence game” means for monetary and ﬁscal poli-
cies in developing countries during a crisis versus what is asked from industrial countries.
11. See Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) on ﬁnancing diﬀerences between developing
countries and industrial countries.guarantee, there was no easy alternative to that action (see Lindgren et al.
1999). Likewise, if stricter bank capitalization requirements had not been
instituted in the crisis countries, we would have seen rampant “double-or-
nothing” lending behavior by insolvent lenders and an even higher ﬁscal bill
for the bank cleanup. Evidence on the existence of a credit crunch in the cri-
sis countries in 1997–98 is far from clear-cut (see Lane et al. 1999).
In areas outside the Fund’s comparative advantage, the Fund drawsheav-
ily on other IFIs with the requisite expertise—and especially on the World
Bank. This collaboration is particularly close on poverty reduction and so-
cial safety net issues but also applies increasingly to corporate governance,
privatization, trade policy, and environmental impacts. Eliminating all
overlap between the IMF and the World Bank (on fiscal and banking re-
form) is neither feasible nor desirable. The Fund’s major focus in the poor
countries remains on the macroeconomic framework—a specialization
that no other IFI is as qualified to handle. A merger of the Fund and the
World Bank is unappealing, both because it would sacriﬁce the speed and
eﬃciency that come with a still rather small IMF and because a mega-IFI
would have too much power across a wide spectrum of macro and micro-
economic issues.
Yes, the Fund has given increased emphasis in recent years to economic
growth and to social conditions in the design and implementation of its pro-
grams with developing countries, just as it was responsive to the unique op-
portunity and massive need for institution-building systems in the ﬂedgling
market economies and new democracies of Eastern Europe. The world has
changed. If the Fund did not change with it, and if the Fund did not em-
brace the same objectives in its programs as its members pursue in their na-
tional economic policies, there would be little chance that IMF programs
would be either agreed upon or implemented (see Camdessus 1999b).
Structural policies are not like macroeconomic policies, and indicators of
policy compliance have to reﬂect those diﬀerences. Progress on banking su-
pervision or privatization cannot be measured in the same way net domes-
tic credit or international reserves are tracked. Performance benchmarks
for structural policies have to be qualitative, and a measure of discretion is
needed to evaluate the results. Also, because of the interdependencies
among structural policies, a macroeconomic impact will come only if pro-
gress is made on many fronts simultaneously. Furthermore, the devil is in
the details. It makes a big diﬀerence if the borrowing country responds to a
Fund condition for a large cut in the budget deﬁcit by slashing expenditure
on health and education versus the curtailment of the national car project.
Moreover, because both the implementation of and payoﬀ from structural
projects take longer than macroeconomic and exchange rate policies, it is
necessary to measure progress along the way. All of this produces many de-
tailed structural performance tests and some uncertainty about whether the
372 Morris Goldsteinoverall eﬀort will warrant Fund ﬁnancial support, but there are no short-
cuts that would work better.
The rest of the paper elaborates on these issues and sets out some addi-
tional arguments and factual material relevant for gauging what IMF struc-
tural policy conditionality should be like in the future. In section 5.1.2, I ask
what, if any, guidance on structural policy involvement can be gleaned from
the Fund’s charter and guidance notes from its executive board. I then dis-
cuss three alternative mandates for Fund lending within which structural
policy conditionality might operate—ranging from a narrow one based on
correction of balance-of-payments problems and resolution of the current
crisis, to broader ones that add avoidance of future crises and pursuit of
“high-quality” economic growth to the agenda. Section 5.1.3 looks at var-
ious dimensions of Fund structural policy involvement and conditional-
ity—both in the Asian crisis countries over the past three years and more
broadly over the past several decades. It also oﬀers some tentative conclu-
sions on the eﬀectiveness of that conditionality, with particular emphasis
on the compliance with Fund conditionality. Because very little factual ma-
terial has been published heretofore on fund structural policy conditional-
ity, this section contains a number of tables and charts documenting the pat-
terns in such conditionality. In section 5.1.4, I speculate on why the scope
and micromanagement of Fund structural policy conditionality have in-
creased in recent years. Section 5.1.5 lays out a set of potential approaches
to streamlining Fund structural policy conditionality if, as seems increas-
ingly likely, the international community and IMF management were to
agree that such streamlining would be desirable. Finally, section 5.1.6 pro-
vides some brief concluding remarks that summarize my own views on
Fund structural policy conditionality.
5.1.2 Structural Policies and the Mandate 
of the International Monetary Fund
Scripture and Field Manuals
One starting point for ﬁguring out how involved the IMF should be in
structural policies would be to look at the Fund’s basic marching orders.
These range from the IMF’s charter (called the “Articles of Agreement”) to
speciﬁc guidance notes issued by the Fund’s executive board to IMF staﬀ.
List A reproduces (from Article I of the Articles of Agreement) the Fund’s
purposes. Although amendments have been made to other parts of the
charter over the past ﬁfty-ﬁve years, this is not so with the purposes. Two
things are immediately obvious from even a casual reading. There are many
purposes, not just one; and there are a number of terms and concepts—
such as “conﬁdence,” “national and international prosperity,” “temporary,”
IMF Structural Programs 373and “exchange system”—that are (and indeed, have been) susceptible to
multiple interpretations.
List A
Purposes of the IMF
1. To promote international monetary cooperation through a perma-
nent institution that provides the machinery for consultation and collabo-
ration on international monetary problems.
2. To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international
trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of
high levels of employment and real income and to the development of the
productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic
policy.
3. To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrange-
ments among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation.
4. To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in
respect of current transactions between members and in the elimination of
foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade.
5. To give conﬁdence to members by making the general resources of the
Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus pro-
viding them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of
payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or interna-
tional prosperity.
6. In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the
degree of disequilibrium in the international balance of payments of mem-
bers.
The Fund shall be guided in all its policies and decisions by the purposes set
forth in this article.
It is clear (at least to me) that a primary objective is not only to correct
balance-of-payments disequilibria but also to do so in a particular way, that
is, in a way that doesn’t involve either excessive deﬂation or unemployment
at home or beggar-thy-neighbor policies. This is how I interpret the phrases
(in paragraph 5) “without resorting to measures destructive of national and
international prosperity” and (in paragraph 3) “to avoid competitive ex-
change depreciation.” Such an interpretation is of course also consistent
with the Fund’s establishment as a response to the beggar-thy-neighbor and
Great Depression problems of the 1920s and 1930s.
There is also clear support for measures that promote openness to inter-
national trade and a multilateral system of payments, and opposition to
measures that hamper this openness. Capital movements are not men-
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circle) lessons of the 1920s and 1930s and with the then popular view about
the perils of destabilizing capital ﬂows.
Although there is no denying that a key task of the IMF at the time of its
creation was to oversee a system of ﬁxed but adjustable exchange rates, I in-
terpret the promotion of “exchange stability” (in paragraph 3) as going be-
yond any particular form of exchange arrangements (be it adjustable pegs,
currency boards, ﬂoating rates, etc.). Put another way, I don’t see the raison
d’être of the Fund as having disappeared in the early 1970s along with the
arrival of ﬂoating exchange rates. If the intention were otherwise, para-
graph 3 would presumably have referred to “exchange rate” stability, and
there be would no purposes other than that one. 
Although Article I makes it plain that the framers regarded “high levels
of employment and income” and “development of productive resources” as
good things, it doesn’t say that the Fund should pursue those objectives by
whatever means available. Instead, they specify that the Fund should facil-
itate “the expansion and balanced growth of international trade” and “con-
tribute thereby” to buoyant domestic economic activity.
Where else might one look in the Fund’s charter for advice relevant to
structural policy conditionality? Many would say the revised (in 1976) Ar-
ticle IV, which deals with general obligations of member countries and with
the Fund’s surveillance responsibilities. Here, economic growth and, to a
lesser extent, international capital movements, get greater play than in the
Fund’s purposes. Speciﬁcally, the new Article IV recognizes speciﬁcally
that the essential purpose of the international monetary system is to provide
a framework that both “facilitates the exchange of goods, services, and cap-
ital among countries, and that sustains sound economic growth.” More
noteworthy, member countries assume the general obligation to “endeavor
to direct . . . economic and ﬁnancial policies toward the objective of foster-
ing orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability,” and the fund
assumes the obligation to oversee the “compliance” of each member coun-
try with this obligation.
Since “economic and ﬁnancial policies” directed toward orderly eco-
nomic growth potentially covers a lot of ground, the practical upshot of the
revised Article IV was that it gave the Fund a much broader license to con-
duct wide-ranging surveillance and annual consultations with members.
Ever since then, the Fund’s Article IV consultation reports have covered a
host of policy areas, including many that would be designated as structural
policies.12 Even though Article IV carries the title “Obligations Regarding
Exchange Arrangements,” it embodied the view that you had to look at the
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12. For a review and analysis of the content of Fund surveillance, see Crow, Arriazu, and
Thygensen (1999).underlying domestic policy determinants of a stable exchange rate system
to see if countries were meeting their international obligations.13 Yes, Ar-
ticle IV is about Fund surveillance, not about Fund policy conditionality.
However, the fact that the former has been given much wider scope (since at
least the mid-1970s) probably has contributed somewhat to a wider ﬁeld of
view in Fund lending arrangements as well (more on that in section 5.1.4).
But what about more speciﬁc directives relating to performance criteria
agreed and issued by the Fund’s executive board? In my view, the most rel-
evant document is probably the conditionality guidelines for standby
arrangements, issued in 1979; see list B. To make a long story short, al-
though the guidelines permit the number and content of performance cri-
teria to vary with a country’s problems and institutional arrangements,
guideline 9 speciﬁes, inter alia, that performance criteria will “normally be
conﬁned to macroeconomic variables” and that “performance criteria may
relate to other variables only in exceptional cases when they are essential for
the eﬀectiveness of the member’s program because of their macroeconomic im-
pact” (italics mine). My interpretation of all this is that, at least in Fund
standby arrangements, the intention was to limit the number of structural-
policy performance criteria and to avoid “micro” conditionality (that is,
measures that don’t have macroeconomic impact). Although these guide-
lines have been revisited many times during later board reviews of condi-
tionality, they have been repeatedly endorsed.
List B
Conditionality Guidelines for Fund Standby Lending
1. Members should be encouraged to adopt corrective measures, which
could be supported by use of the Fund’s general resources in accordance
with the Fund’s policies, at an early stage of their balance-of-payments
diﬃculties. The article IV consultations are among the occasions on which
the Fund would be able to discuss with members adjustment programs,
including corrective measures, that would enable the Fund to approve a
stand-by arrangement.
2. The normal period for a stand-by arrangement will be one year. If,
however, a longer period is requested by a member and considered neces-
sary by the Fund to enable the member to implement its adjustment pro-
gram successfully, the stand-by arrangement may extend beyond the period
of one year. This period in appropriate cases may extend up to but not be-
yond three years.
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13. Eichengreen (1999) has made a similar argument that the Fund cannot expect to be suc-
cessful at promoting international ﬁnancial stability without addressing sources of ﬁnancial
instability at the national level.3. Stand-by arrangements are not international agreements and there-
fore language having a contractual connotation will be avoided in stand-by
arrangements and letters of intent.
4. In helping members to devise adjustment programs, the Fund will pay
due regard to domestic social and political objectives, the economic pri-
orities, and the circumstances of members, including the causes of their
balance-of-payments problems.
5. Appropriate consultation clauses will be incorporated in all stand-by
arrangements. Such clauses will include provision for consultation from
time to time during the whole period in which the member has outstanding
purchases in the upper limit tranches. This provision will apply to whether
the outstanding purchases were made under a stand-by arrangement or in
other transactions in the upper credit tranches.
6. Phasing and performance clauses will be omitted in stand-by arrange-
ments that do not go beyond the ﬁrst credit tranche. They will be included
in all other stand-by arrangements but these clauses will be applicable only
to purchases beyond the ﬁrst credit tranche.
7. The managing director will recommend that the executive board ap-
prove a member’s request for the use of the Fund’s general resources in the
credit tranches when it is his or her judgment that the program is consistent
with the Fund’s provisions and policies and that it will be carried out. A
member may be expected to adopt some corrective measures before a
stand-by arrangement is approved by the Fund, but only if necessary to en-
able the member to adopt and carry out a program consistent with the
Fund’s provisions and policies. In these cases the managing director will
keep executive directors informed in an appropriate manner of the progress
of discussions with the member.
8. The managing director will ensure adequate coordination in the ap-
plication of policies relating to the use of the Fund’s general resources with
a view to maintaining the nondiscriminatory treatment of members.
9. The number and content of performance criteria may vary because of
the diversity of problems and institutional arrangements of members. Per-
formance criteria will be limited to those that are necessary to evaluate
implementation of the program with a view to ensuring that the achieve-
ment of its objectives. Performance criteria will normally be conﬁned to
(a) macroeconomic variables and (b) those necessary to implement speciﬁc
provisions of the articles or policies adopted under them. Performance cri-
teria may relate to other variables only in exceptional cases when they are
essential for the eﬀectiveness of the member’s program because of their
macroeconomic impact.
10. In programs extending beyond one year, or in circumstances in
which a member is unable to establish in advance one or more performance
criteria for all or part of the program period, provision will be made for a
review in order to reach the necessary understandings with the member for
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sential feature of the program cannot be formulated as a performance cri-
terion at the beginning of a program year because of substantial uncertain-
ties concerning major economic trends, provision will be made for a review
by the Fund to evaluate the current macroeconomic policies of the member,
and to reach new understandings if necessary. In these exceptional cases the
managing director will inform executive directors in an appropriate manner
of the subject matter of a review.
11. The staﬀwill prepare an analysis and assessment of the performance
under programs supported by use of the Fund’s general resources in the
credit tranches in connection with article IV consultations and as appro-
priate in connection with further requests for use of the Fund’s resources.
12. The staﬀ will from time to time prepare, for review by the executive
board, studies of programs supported by stand-by arrangements in order to
evaluate and compare the appropriateness of the programs, the eﬀective-
ness of the policy instruments, and the observance of the programs, and the
results achieved. Such reviews will enable the executive board to determine
when it may be appropriate to have the next comprehensive review of con-
ditionality.
However, one must also take note that a variety of other lending arrange-
ments (besides standbys) has been created in the Fund with the support of
the membership over the past thirty years (ranging from a facility to assist
transition economies in coping with the shift away from state trading to
multilateral market-based trading, to one that was to assist countries expe-
riencing liquidity problems related to Y2K). More to the point of this pa-
per, some of those lending windows are directly aimed at protracted bal-
ance-of-payments problems and at supporting comprehensive eﬀorts at
macroeconomic and structural reform. These include the Extended Fund
Facility (EFF; established in 1974), and both the Structural Adjustment Fa-
cility (SAF; established in 1986) and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Fa-
cility (ESAF; established in 1987); eligibility for both the SAF and the
ESAF is restricted to low-income countries.14 For these lending windows,
structural policy involvement is at the heart of the exercise, and there is little
guidance on how many or what kinds of structural policy measures would
be viewed as “out of bounds.”
Given the prominence of governance issues in the Asian crisis, a ﬁnal
guidance note worth noting is the one issued in July 1997 by the Fund’s ex-
ecutive board on “The Role of the IMF in Governance Issues.” Although
the note states right at the beginning that “the responsibility for governance
issues lies ﬁrst and foremost with the national authorities,” it seems to give
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14. In 1999, the ESAF was reorganized into the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
(PRGF).the Fund staﬀ quite a wide berth to include governance and corruption
measures in Fund conditionality if they can make the case that governance
problems have some direct macroeconomic impact. In addition, although
the note urges the Fund staﬀ to rely on other institutions’ expertise in areas
of their purview, it states that the Fund could nevertheless recommend con-
ditionality in those areas (outside the Fund’s expertise) if the staﬀ consid-
ered that such measures were “critical to the successful implementation of
the program.” Given the timing and context of this guidance note (just at
the outset of the Asian crisis), some IMF staﬀ have expressed the view (to
me) that the Fund’s board was sending them a signal that they would hence-
forth not support programs that ignored serious and widespread gover-
nance and corruption problems.
To sum up, the Fund’s existing marching orders on structural policy
conditionality are Janus-faced enough that both supporters of narrow con-
ditionality and those of more comprehensive conditionality can ﬁnd their
own biblical passages to buttress their arguments. On the one side, I don’t
see in the Fund’s charter a broad agenda aimed at high-quality growth.
What I see instead is a focus on balance-of-payments adjustment, trade
opening, elimination of payments restrictions, eﬀorts to increase the sta-
bility of the exchange rate system, and a directive to avoid modes of exter-
nal adjustment that make recession or deﬂation deeper than necessary and
that impose undue costs on other countries.15 This is not to deny that the
Fund’s membership may want to pursue high-quality growth (and poverty
reduction) for a variety of reasons, including moral imperatives. It’s just
that I can’t ﬁnd that commandment on the original stone tablets. In a sim-
ilar vein, the Fund’s conditionality guidelines for standby arrangements
appear to have had the intention of limiting the number of structural per-
formance criteria, particularly if they are micro in nature. On the other side
of the ledger, the Fund’s overall surveillance responsibilities (under the re-
vised Article IV) are quite wide-ranging: as regards structural policies, a
succession of speciﬁc lending windows has been established over the past
twenty-five years or so with an explicit structural policy orientation, and
guidance notes on “new” structural policy issues like governance and cor-
ruption give the Fund staﬀ considerable leeway to include such measures
in conditionality as long as they can make a case that they are critical to
the success of the program. Perhaps more telling, I could ﬁnd no evidence
of concern about the scope or intrusiveness of structural policy condition-
ality in the published summaries (so-called Public Information Notices, or
PINs) of executive board meetings on the Thai, Indonesian, and Korean
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15. It’s also relevant to note that, unlike the charter of the EBRD, the Fund’s charter says
nothing about promoting “democracy”; see Polak (1991) for a discussion of political inﬂu-
ences on IMF lending.programs over the past three years—even though the number and detail of
structural conditions in those three programs are extraordinary (see sec-
tion 5.1.3 below).
Three Alternative Mandates
If there is relatively little guidance available about the appropriate intru-
siveness of Fund structural policy conditionality from oﬃcial sources, one
might consider what diﬀerent mandates for the Fund would imply about
such conditionality. Here, I consider three possibilities, starting with the
narrowest and ending with the broadest (and most ambitious).
Mandate I
The Fund’s primary focus would be on macroeconomic and ﬁnancial stabil-
ity; its crisis management guideline would be to assist a country to get out of
the current crisis as soon as possible (without imposing undue costs on itself
or its neighbors).
An announced IMF focus on macroeconomic and ﬁnancial stability
would be similar to the increasing popular practice of national central
banks to announce that their primary objective is price stability. It doesn’t
preclude giving some consideration to other objectives, but it makes clear
which objective is king and where the authority’s central responsibility lies.
The emphasis on getting out of the current crisis would mean that crisis
management and resolution—and not crisis prevention—should guide
program design. Crisis prevention measures would presumably then be
handled by the country on its own after the current crisis is resolved.
Would Mandate I preclude Fund structural policy conditionality during
a crisis? The answer, I believe, is no. However, the extent of the structural
conditions would be limited to measures directly related to resolution of the
current crisis, and their form would depend on both the nature of the crisis
and the institutional structure in place in the crisis country; in addition, the
design of essential structural policy conditions outside the Fund’s core
competence (monetary, ﬁscal, exchange rate, and ﬁnancial-sector policies)
would need to be handled by other international financial institutions
(IFIs). A few examples should suﬃce to illustrate the point.
Suppose that key contributory factors to a balance-of-payments crisis
were an overvalued exchange rate and overly expansionary monetary and
ﬁscal policies. Also assume that correction of relative prices was being
thwarted by widespread indexation agreements in wage contracts. Assume
that the alternatives to devaluation as an adjustment tool are a more dra-
conian tightening of monetary or ﬁscal policy (which would drive the do-
mestic economy into deep recession) and a large hike in tariﬀ and nontariﬀ
barriers. In that case, reduction or elimination of those indexation provi-
sions could be regarded as essential to external adjustment (without either
380 Morris Goldsteinexcessive deﬂation or beggar-thy-neighbor eﬀects), and a labor-market per-
formance test could be part of conditionality.16
Next, consider a case in which the primary source of the external dise-
quilibrium is a large budget deﬁcit. Assume that the necessary ﬁscal adjust-
ment needs to be large, that the economy is expected to undergo a serious
contraction, that the incumbent government is quite unpopular at home
(because there is a long history of cronyism and corruption), and that there
is no social safety net to speak of. In that situation, it could be argued that
the Fund program needs to contain a few structural measures (e.g., the clos-
ing of a government cartel or monopoly) to send a visible signal to the
public that some patronage is being taken away from well-connected gov-
ernment cronies and therefore that the program will be even-handed—and
this even if the structural measures themselves have no macroeconomic im-
pact and lie outside the Fund’s core competence.17 Here, these structural
measures might be defended as necessary to establish conﬁdence. Similarly,
the creation of an unemployment insurance scheme or some other form of
social safety net could be viewed as necessary to sustain popular support for
the ﬁscal correction eﬀort over the one- or two-year program period.
Next, picture a situation in which a banking crisis is under way and no de-
posit insurance system is in place. Depositors are withdrawing deposits
from a group of weak banks, and the government is supporting the weak
banks’ ability to meet withdrawals by providing liquidity assistance to those
banks. The deposit run is spreading, and the liquidity injections are pump-
ing up the monetary aggregates and driving down the exchange rate. It is
also known that substantial funds will soon be needed to recapitalize insol-
vent banks and to increase capital at solvent but still weak banks. Because
its debt burden is already high, the government cannot fund all the bank
cleanup costs on its own. It will need help from private creditors abroad.
Here, too, one could defend structural conditions relating to bank closures
or to deposit insurance reform as being essential for resolving the current
crisis; without them, the authorities will not be able to control monetary
policy and to halt the free fall of the currency. If the immediate aim of rais-
ing funds from abroad is being hampered by restrictions on capital inﬂows
or by poor disclosure that prevents foreign creditors from judging the worth
of domestic banks, the removal or correction of restrictions or disclosure
practices too might be defended as a legitimate element in conditionality.
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16. Another example in which labor market policies could be considered essential to over-
coming the current crisis is when a banking crisis cannot be overcome without ﬁnancial-sector
and corporate restructuring, and the latter cannot be accomplished without revision of re-
strictive laws governing employee layoﬀs.
17. Allen (1993, 18) takes such a view: “Structural policies can also help build and maintain
the political consensus that will support macroeconomic stabilization—for example, by com-
bating unproductive and politically unpopular rent-seeking activities.”In contrast to the above scenarios, consider a crisis situation brought on,
say, by a large terms-of-trade shock or a shift in investor sentiment stem-
ming from contagion in a neighboring country. Assume also that there are
many structural-policy weaknesses and institutional gaps but that these are
not serious enough or linked closely enough to monetary, ﬁscal, and ex-
change rate policies to prevent the crisis from being resolved with tradi-
tional macroeconomic instruments plus some Fund ﬁnancing. Here, how-
ever desirable structural measures may be for longer-term performance,
they would not be included as conditions for the program. A plain vanilla
Fund program will do the job.
Another relevant question is whether Mandate I would still permit the
Fund to make a contribution to poverty reduction in poor countries. The
answer is yes, but only insofar as macroeconomic and ﬁnancial stability it-
self contributes to poverty reduction, or because the Fund (in collaboration
with the World Bank) sees the incorporation of social safety nets into crisis
resolution programs as necessary for the successful implementation of those
programs. Longer-term eﬀorts (outside of crises) to fight poverty would
then be handled by the World Bank and the regional development banks.
Mandate II
The Fund’s primary focus would be (as in Mandate I) on macroeconomic
and ﬁnancial stability: its crisis guideline would be to assist a country not only
to get out of the current crisis but also to minimize the chances of getting into
another one down the road.
Although the Fund’s core competence remains the same in Mandate II
as in Mandate I, the big diﬀerence is that the fund now incorporates crisis
prevention as well as crisis resolution in program design. An implicit judg-
ment here is that the country needs to use the crisis as a mechanism to re-
duce its crisis vulnerability and that it would not be able to do this on its own
(i.e., without a Fund program) after the current crisis is resolved. Better,
then, to “make hay while the sun shines” and combine crisis resolution and
crisis prevention in the current program. If conﬁdence in the crisis economy
is very low, the Fund might also argue that investors will not return unless
there is evidence that the probability of another (near-term) crisis is low;
this in turn requires proof that the old (crisis-prone) system is changing, and
structural reform would be part and parcel of such proof.
Mandate II increases substantially the scope for structural policy condi-
tionality, even without going into noncore areas of economic policy. Again,
a few examples convey the ﬂavor.
Assume that the country has a long-standing problem of undisciplined
monetary policy and that monetary policy excesses are also a key factor in
the current crisis. In that case, the Fund might argue that a performance cri-
terion that simply says that monetary policy will be tightened within the ex-
isting regime will not be credible. In this situation, the program might con-
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pendence to the central bank or takes the monetary reins out of the central
bank’s hands by establishing a currency board or single currency.
One could tell a similar story about long-standing weaknesses in ﬁscal
policy that lead a country to accumulate a very heavy external debt burden.
When, say, a large negative shock occurs to the terms of trade (e.g., oil prices
fall), foreign investors run for the exits and a debt crisis breaks out. Assume
that the chronically weak ﬁscal position owes much to a narrow tax base, to
a host of large loss-making public enterprises, and to the absence of proper
expenditure-control and budgeting departments in the ministry of ﬁnance.
In parallel with the immediately preceding example, the Fund might argue
that a performance criterion that simply targets a lower ﬁscal deﬁcit for the
next year will not be credible. As such, the Fund program could contain struc-
tural conditions for widening the tax base, for privatizing state enterprises,
and for establishing new administrative units in the ministry of ﬁnance.
Carrying forward the same theme, imagine a banking crisis whose prox-
imate determinants are a sharp contraction of economic activity or a sharp
rise in interest rates connected with a defense of a ﬁxed exchange rate. How-
ever, assume also that there was a large backlog of nonperforming loans
brought on by the following: state-owned banks that lent without any re-
gard to creditworthiness of borrowers; commercial banks that had long
demonstrated a proclivity toward “connected lending”; lax loan classiﬁca-
tion procedures that encouraged the “evergreening” of bad loans and that
grossly overstated the true value of bank capital; a legal framework that
made it diﬃcult for banks to seize collateral from bankrupt borrowers; in-
eﬀective banking supervision from a bank supervisory agency that had nei-
ther the political independence nor the mandate or resources to do its job;
and lender moral hazard, stoked by repeated episodes of bailing out bank
depositors and creditors. Against such a background, the Fund might
maintain that a program that merely speciﬁed closing insolvent banks and
recapitalizing others to international standards would amount to ﬂushing
money down the drain. Even if the current banking crisis were resolved, it
wouldn’t be long before the same underlying vulnerabilities produced a rep-
etition (thereby exacerbating the problem of “prolonged use” of Fund re-
sources). Better then—so the argument would go—to require structural
policy conditions that would change each of these poor banking and su-
pervisory practices.
The same kind of argument could be made about the need for conditions
(on bank bailouts and the like) to control moral hazard problems, which, by
deﬁnition, relate to the eﬀect of inappropriately priced insurance arrange-
ments (extended this period) on the risk-taking behavior of policyholders
next period. Put in other words, it is precisely the worry about avoiding the
next crisis that makes it necessary to put additional conditions on the man-
agement of the current crisis.
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The Fund’s focus would be on macroeconomic and ﬁnancial stability and on
sustainable growth; its crisis guideline would be to assist the country not only
to get out of the current crisis and to reduce its crisis vulnerability but also to
put in place the conditions for sustainable high-quality growth.
The diﬀerence here with respect to Mandates I and II is that high-quality
growth now occupies a more central role both in the Fund’s overall mandate
and in its crisis-ﬁghting strategy. Under this more holistic approach, condi-
tionality would likely encompass measures that are viewed as necessary to
improve economic growth and protect the poor and the vulnerable, as well
as measures to improve the country’s resilience to future crises. A hypothet-
ical country scenario can again help to illustrate the diﬀerences involved.
Consider a country that is suﬀering from persistently weak economic
growth, a chronic budget deﬁcit, a weak external position, pervasive state
intervention, heavy public ownership, protectionism, and a host of gover-
nance and corruption problems. A large, negative terms-of-trade shock or
a group of bank failures may have pushed this country into crisis, but for
the last decade or more it may never have been very far away from crisis.
Reﬂecting the focus on economic growth (under Mandate III), the Fund
and the country authorities might agree that the program ought to have a
three-year rather than a one-year tenure, so that any aggregate demand re-
ductions could be made more gradual and so that there would be more time
for structural reform to take hold. In addition, the Fund might ask that the
country only make good progress toward external payments viability dur-
ing the program period rather than actually achieving such viability. In an
eﬀort to reduce distortions that create an anti-export bias and that hamper
eﬃcient resource allocation, the program might well call for the following:
scaling back the extent of price controls and state intervention in marketing
of exports, foodstuﬀs, fertilizer, and petroleum products; the reduction or
elimination of surrender requirements and controls on foreign exchange al-
location; reduced reliance on quantitative restrictions on imports and a re-
duction in the level and dispersion of tariﬀ rates; privatization of selected
public enterprises and the entering into of “performance contracts” with
existing managers of public enterprises; liberalization of interest rates (and
other measures to move from state to market allocation of credit); develop-
ment of ﬁnancial markets for interbank funds, government securities, and
stocks; and the phasing-out of government-owned banks.
To protect the most vulnerable groups, such a program would probably
also place conditions on the composition of government expenditure cuts, as
well as an overall target for the budget deﬁcit. Speciﬁcally, these structural
conditions could call, inter alia, for a shift in government expenditure away
from military and “showcase” expenditures toward expenditure on primary
education and health care; severance pay and retraining for workers released
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abrupt) reduction of price controls on commodities that loom large in poor
people’s budgets; and the creation of an unemployment insurance system.
There might likewise be provisions for special credit arrangements for agri-
cultural producers and for small and medium-sized businesses, and the diﬀ-
erential impact of currency devaluation on urban consumers versus agricul-
tural exporters might be subject to partial compensation. As part of eﬀorts
to combat corruption problems, audits and public disclosure of ﬁndings
might be required of certain ﬁnancial institutions and of government-
sponsored monopolies, and employment practices in the civil service could
be subject to review. Additionally, core labor standards might be put forward
if there were strong evidence of signiﬁcant departures from them.
To sum up, what gets included in Fund structural policy conditionality
depends in good measure on the nature of the crisis and on the extent of
interdependence between traditional Fund macroeconomic policy instru-
ments and structural policies. But the intrusiveness of conditionality also de-
pends on how broad are the objectives of the Fund and the country authorities.
Trying to get out of the current crisis is one thing. Trying to ward oﬀ a fu-
ture crisis is quite another. And trying to spur high-quality growth in a low-
income country with a host of government-induced distortions and large
institutional gaps is something else again. Yet another relevant factor, par-
ticularly as regards the intensity or degree of detail in Fund conditionality,
is how much conﬁdence the IMF and creditor governments have in the will-
ingness of the crisis country to carry through on its policy commitments;
the greater the skepticism on that score, the greater is likely to be the num-
ber of prior actions and other performance tests included in programs.
However, that takes us into the next section.
5.1.3 The Structural Content of Fund Policy Conditionality 
and Its Eﬀectiveness
Thus far, I have summarized arguments about Fund structural policy
conditionality and discussed how the Fund’s mandate might aﬀect the
scope and details of such conditionality. However, I have not discussed the
available facts on Fund structural policy conditionality, nor the existing lit-
erature on the eﬀectiveness of conditionality. That is the subject of this sec-
tion. First, I ask how commonplace, wide-ranging, and detailed structural
policy conditions have been in Fund programs; whether structural policy
conditionality seems to be increasing over time; in what policy areas struc-
tural conditionality has been most intensive; and what performance tests
have been used to monitor this conditionality. Second, I then ask what we
know about the eﬀectiveness of that structural policy conditionality, in-
cluding the track record on compliance with Fund conditionality. Most of
these questions are not entirely straightforward to answer, both because the
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Fund policy conditionality (that is, what would happen in the absence of a
Fund program) is extremely diﬃcult to know or to estimate.
Structural Policies in Fund Programs
Since there is no comprehensive index of Fund structural policy condi-
tionality that is available over a long time period, one has to rely on a set of
statistics to tell the story. In what follows, I review, in turn: (a) data on the
number of total structural policy conditions per program year for a sample
of twenty Stand-By Arrangements (SBAs) and twelve EFFs for the 1996–
99 period; (b) data on the average number of structural performance crite-
ria for all Fund programs over the 1993–99 period; (c) data on the number
of structural policy conditions (overwhelmingly structural benchmarks)
in recent (1997–2000) Fund programs with three Asian crisis countries (In-
donesia, South Korea, and Thailand); (d) data on the average number of
structural benchmarks per Fund program for thirty-three transition econ-
omies over the 1993–99 period; and (e) data on the number of structural
benchmarks in earlier SAF programs. For each body of data, I am inter-
ested not only in the scope and intensity of structural policy conditionality,
but also in the trend, the diﬀerences across diﬀerent types of Fund pro-
grams (SBAs, EFFs, and SAF/ESAF/PRGF programs), and the distribu-
tion across structural policy areas.
Before getting to all that, a brief digression on the instruments that the
Fund uses to monitor compliance with conditionality is warranted. For the
purposes of this paper, four of these are of interest.
Performance criteria (PCs) are meant to provide a direct link between
program implementation and disbursement of Fund resources. If the crite-
rion is met on the agreed test date (typically set at quarterly intervals), the
member country is assured of disbursement; if the criterion is not met, the
country cannot draw unless a waiver is obtained. Waivers are granted when
a country’s noncompliance with performance criteria is viewed by the Fund
as inconsequential or when it reﬂects signiﬁcant exogenous developments
not foreseen at the time the program was framed.18 PCs are expected to be
under the control of the borrower, capable of being precisely and objectively
formulated and monitored, and subject to relatively short (usually less than
forty-five days) reporting lags. In the structural area, a PC could, for ex-
ample, specify that elimination of restriction x on current payments be ac-
complished by date y, or that three insolvent ﬁnance companies be closed
by date z. Prior actions are policy measures that the country agrees to take
before a Fund agreement goes into eﬀect. They are apt to be employed when
severe imbalances exist and the country is viewed as having had a poor track
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18. Waivers also require that the authorities have taken the necessary action to bring the pro-
gram back on track if this is necessary to meet its objectives.record of implementation (in earlier Fund programs). Structural bench-
marks (SBMs) are indicators that aim to delineate the expected path of re-
form for individual structural policy measures and that can facilitate the
evaluation of progress for these actions. Because many structural policies
cannot be expressed in quantitative form, structural benchmarks are usu-
ally expressed qualitatively; for example, if the program calls for privatiza-
tion of the state-owned telephone company, submitting the privatization
bill to the legislature by date x could be one structural benchmark. Failure
to meet structural benchmarks conveys a negative signal but does not au-
tomatically render a country ineligible to draw; instead, a decision about el-
igibility would be judgmental and would likely be taken in a broader mid-
year program review—itself an instrument of conditionality—with an eye
toward the country’s overall progress on the structural front. Program re-
views, like SBMs, assess implementation of policies not amenable to moni-
toring via PCs (because of their imprecise or qualitative nature). Reviews
are broader than individual SBMs and can be used, for example, to assess
whether there needs to be a change in program design.19
Number of (Total) Structural Policy Conditions per Program Year
At this point, the most comprehensive measure of Fund structural policy
conditionality is that produced by the Fund itself via its so-called MONA
database (which stands for Monitoring Fund Arrangements). It is the only
series available that combines information on all four types of structural
conditions, namely, performance criteria, structural benchmarks, prior ac-
tions, and conditions for completion of program reviews. When only one of
those structural policy conditions is used, there is a danger that you are see-
ing only one part of the elephant. The Fund’s index of programmed struc-
tural policy measures is then divided by the length of the period to obtain
ﬁgures on number of programmed structural policy measures per annum.
The rub is that this comprehensive measure is so far available only for the
twenty SBAs and twelve EFFs over the 1996–99 period. To my knowledge,
this comprehensive measure of Fund structural policy conditions has not
been published before.
Table 5.1 presents the goods. Three conclusions stand out. First, the
number of structural policy conditions that would be typical for, say, a
three-year EFF Fund program over the last few years is high; speciﬁcally, it
would be more than ﬁfty (three times the annual average of eighteen mea-
sures per annum).20 For a typical one-year SBA, it would be somewhere be-
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19. When conditionality includes a program review, the text of the arrangement speciﬁes
what elements are to be reviewed; the review also assesses whether or not the program’s objec-
tives are in jeopardy.
20. Because the data in table 5.1 are expressed as the number of conditions per annum rather
than per program, I need to assume that the number of conditions varies proportionally with
time to arrive at conclusions about the number in conditions in a “typical” three-year program.tween nine and ﬁfteen (depending on whether we used the median or the
mean). This is a far cry from the “only in exceptional cases” guideline called
for in the (1979) conditionality guidelines for SBAs. Second, the median
number of structural policy conditions is much higher (double) for EFFs
than for SBAs. This is not surprising. As noted earlier, EFFs must have a
structural policy orientation; SBAs may have structural conditionality, too,
but don’t necessarily have to (if structural problems are not viewed as seri-
ous or pressing). Note that the diﬀerence between SBAs and EFFs vanishes
when one looks at the mean number of conditions—a ﬁnding that could
well reﬂect the presence of a few SBAs with very high structural policy con-
tent. Third, there is quite a lot of variation across both SBAs and EFFs in
the extent of structural policy conditionality. Because these data are thus
far available only for the 1996–99 period as a whole, there is nothing that
can be said here about trends.
The Fund has broken down its comprehensive measure of structural pol-
icy conditions into ten broad policy areas. The results are portrayed in ﬁg-
ure 5.1. In short, what we see there is that about two-thirds of structural pol-
icy conditions are concentrated in three areas: ﬁnancial-sector policies, tax
and expenditure reforms, and public enterprises and privatizations. Since
the Fund’s core competence is often identiﬁed to be monetary, ﬁscal, ex-
change rate, and ﬁnancial-sector policies (see, e.g., Council on Foreign Re-
lations Task Force 1999), this would seem to belie the charge that, on aver-
age, most of the Fund’s focus in structural policies is far aﬁeld from its main
expertise—or, to put it in other words, that Fund structural policy condi-
tionality is typically “a mile wide and an inch thick.” At the same time, ﬁg-
ure 5.1 does show that fund structural policy conditionality has reached
into a number of “noncore” structural policy areas (e.g., labor markets, so-
cial safety nets).
Average Number of Structural Performance Criteria per Program
The Fund’s MONA database also contains information on performance
criteria (PCs) for the longer 1993–99 period. Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4present
the average number of performance criteria per program for all Fund pro-
grams, for ESAF/PRGF programs, and for SBA and EFF programs, re-
spectively; separate ﬁgures are also given for the transition economies and
(in table 5.2) for the Asian economies. In these tables, “quantitative perfor-
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9mance criteria” refers to macroeconomic variables (e.g., the nominal value
of the ﬁscal deﬁcit, net domestic credit of the central bank, the stock of net
international reserves, etc.) that are used to track compliance with mone-
tary, ﬁscal, exchange rate, and external debt policies. “Structural perfor-
mance” criteria are meant to assess compliance with important structural
policy commitments. Note that the data here are calculated per program,
not per program year. This is more informative in some respects but also
carries the disadvantage that the annual ﬁgures can be biased upward
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Table 5.2 Summary of Performance Criteria in Fund-Supported Programs, 1993–99
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
A. Total Number of Arrangements
Number of programs approved 
by year 22 35 30 32 21 21 20
Number of performance criteria 218 373 327 419 328 234 203
Quantitative 186 276 268 297 191 173 150
Structural 32 97 59 122 137 61 53
Number of performance criteria 




Number of programs approved 
by year 98 12 12764
Number of performance criteria 82 79 100 156 73 90 37
Quantitative 78 67 100 125 67 64 37
Structural 4 12 0 31 6 26 0
Number of performance criteria 
per program 9 10 8 13 10 15 9
Quantitative 9 8 8 10 10 11 9
Structural 0.4 203140
C. Asian Economies
Number of programs approved 
by year 0 000310
Number of performance criteria 0 0 0 0 59 9 0
Quantitative 0 0 0 0 18 5 0
Structural 0 0 0 0 41 4 0
Number of performance criteria 
per program 20 9
Quantitative 6 5
Structural 14 4
Notes: Stand-by, extended facility, and SAF/ESAF/PRGF arrangements. Number of performance crite-
ria refers to all performance criteria over the duration of the program. Performance criteria are classiﬁed
by year of program approval, irrespective of test dates they applied to. Quantitative performance criteria
applying to the same variable are counted only once, even if observance was required for more than one
test date.(downward) if there are more (less) multiyear arrangements agreed in a
given year. Note also that because we are dealing only with one component
of structural policy conditionality in tables 5.2–5.4, we have to be careful
about generalizing about the overall intrusiveness of Fund structural policy
conditionality from these ﬁgures.
Five main conclusions emerge from tables 5.2–5.6. One is that “struc-
tural” PCs are on average less numerous than quantitative macroeconomic
PCs—with the notable exception of the three programs for the Asian crisis
economies in 1997 (see the upper two panels of table 5.2 versus the lowest
one). A second conclusion is that the number of structural PCs in the pro-
grams with the three Asian crisis economies in 1997 (an average of 14.0 per
program) was far above (roughly four times) both the average for all fund
programs over the 1993–99 period (an average of 3.3 per program) and for
1997 alone (an average of 7.0 per program); in contrast, the average number
of quantitative macroeconomic PCs was actually lower in the Asian econ-
omies than for all Fund programs. Finding number three is that the average
number of structural PCs in programs with the transition economies was
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Table 5.3 Summary of Performance Criteria in ESAF/PRGF Arrangements, 1993–99
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
A. Total Number of Arrangements
Number of programs approved 
by year 7 137 1 47 1 19
Number of performance criteria 86 183 116 227 134 132 106
Quantitative 61 102 81 118 72 97 68
Structural 25 81 35 109 62 35 38
Number of performance criteria 
per program 12 141 71 61 91 21 2
Quantitative 9 8 12 8 10 9 8
Structural 4 658934
B. Transition Economies
Number of programs approved 
by year 1 103130
Number of performance criteria 14 14 — 60 17 42 —
Quantitative 10 9 — 33 13 31 —
Structural 4 5 — 27 4 11 —
Number of performance criteria 
per program 14 14 — 20 17 14 —
Quantitative 10 9 — 11 13 10 —
Structural 4.0 5 — 9 4 4 —
Notes: Number of performance criteria refers to all performance criteria over the duration of the pro-
gram. Performance criteria are classiﬁed by year of program approval, irrespective of test dates they ap-
plied to. Quantitative performance criteria applying to the same variable are counted only once, even if
observance was required for more than one test date. Dashes indicate no program was assessed for that
year.below (not above) the average for all Fund programs over this period.
Fourth, there have on average been more structural PCs in ESAF/PRGF
programs than in SBA and EFF arrangements (taken together).
A fifth finding—at least for all Fund arrangements taken together—is
that we do observe some upward trend in the average number of structural
PCs as we move from the earlier part of the period (2.0 in 1993–95) to the
latter part (3.3 in 1996 and 98–99)—even if we exclude 1997; that being said,
the straw that stirs the drink in the average of PC numbers is clearly the high
ﬁgure (14.0 per program) for the three programs with Asian crisis countries
in 1997.
Unfortunately, there are no directly comparable statistics on average
number of structural PCs for earlier periods. An unpublished IMF (1987a)
study on SBAs and EFFs during the 1979–97 period does show the break-
down of structural PCs by policy area; if I make the (risky) assumption that
there was only one PC per policy area indicated for each country, I get an
estimate of 1.3 structural PCs per program for that period—about one-
third of the average ﬁgure (3.3) for 1993–99 (from table 5.2). Polak (1991)
reports the average number of total PCs (presumably, quantitative macro-
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Table 5.4 Summary of Performance Criteria in SBA/EFF Arrangements, 1993–99
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
A. Total Number of Arrangements
Number of programs approved 
by year 15 22 23 18 14 10 11
Number of performance criteria 132 190 211 192 194 102 97
Quantitative 125 174 187 179 119 76 82
Structural 7 16 24 13 75 26 15
Number of performance criteria 
per program 9 9 9 11 14 10 9
Quantitative 8 8 8 10 9 8 7
Structural 0 11153 1
B. Transition Economies
Number of programs approved 
by year 87 1 2963 4
Number of performance criteria 68 65 100 96 56 48 37
Quantitative 68 58 100 92 54 33 37
Structural 0 7042 1 5 0
Number of performance criteria 
per program 9 9 8 11 9 16 9
Quantitative 9 8 8 10 9 11 9
Structural 0.0 10005 0
Notes: Number of performance criteria refers to all performance criteria over the duration of the pro-
gram. Performance criteria are classiﬁed by year of program approval, irrespective of test dates they ap-
plied to. Quantitative performance criteria applying to the same variable are counted only once, even if
observance was required for more than one test date.economic PCs plus structural PCs) per program for some earlier periods.
Speciﬁcally, his ﬁgures are less than 6.0 per arrangement for 1968–77, 7.0 in
1974–84, and 9.5 in 1984–87. The comparable ﬁgure taken from table 5.2
for average (total) PCs per program over 1993–99 would be 11.7. If other
monitoring components of Fund policy conditionality (prior actions,
SBMs, conditions for program reviews) moved in the same direction over
this period—and Polak suggests they have—this would point to a signif-
icant increase in the monitoring of Fund conditionality over the past thirty
years or so.
As regards the distribution of structural PCs across policy areas for ear-
lier periods, the same 1987 IMF study found that the leading categories
were the exchange system (12 percent) and the trade system (6 percent). The
ﬁnancial sector, which led the parade in ﬁgure 5.1, was in third place in
1979–87, and ﬁscal policy was yet further behind.
Number of Structural Policy Conditions in Recent Fund Programs 
with Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand
Since Fund structural policy conditionality in three Asian crisis coun-
tries has had a lot to do with reopening the debate on the appropriate scope
and detail of conditionality, it makes sense to give those programs a sepa-
rate look. In table 5.5, I provide a running count of the number of struc-
tural policy conditions—believed to be overwhelmingly made up of con-
ditions for program reviews and structural benchmarks—contained in
successive revisions of the Indonesian, Korean, and Thai programs over
the 1997–2000 period. In ﬁgure 5.2, I present a rough breakdown of the
three crisis programs by structural policy areas. In an eﬀort to convey the
ﬂavor of the detail in those programs, I have also reproduced in list
C the ﬁrst half of the full SBM matrix for Indonesia as of June 1998. Per-
haps it is a hint of one of the main conclusions that it was not practical to
attach the full list of structural policy conditions for all three programs: as
a group, they are much too long for a paper of this length. The reader
should be cautioned that counting the number of structural policy com-
mitments says nothing about which conditions are more important or are
more intrusive. Nor does such a count tell us which commitments came
at the initiative of the country authorities and which came from the
Fund.21 Moreover, such a count mixes together what might be called for-
mal conditionality (monitored by speciﬁc performance criteria and struc-
tural benchmarks) and informal conditionality (monitored by program re-
views).
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21. Fund staﬀnote that country authorities often use an IMF letter of intent to underline or
to “advertise” policy reforms that have recently been made and those that are expected to be












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Indonesia: Excerpts from Structural Policy Conditions
Policy Action
Fiscal Issues
Remove VAT exemption arrangements.
Increase proportion of market value of land and buildings assessable for
tax to 40 percent for plantation and forestry.
Introduce single-taxpayer registration number.
Increase non-oil tax revenue by raising annual audit coverage, developing
improved VAT audit programs, and increasing recovery of tax arrears.
Increase in two stages excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco to reﬂect
exchange rate and price developments.
Raise proﬁt transfers to the budget from state enterprises, including
Pertamina.
Raise prices on rice, sugar, wheat ﬂour, corn, soybean meal, and ﬁsh meal.
Eliminate subsidies on sugar, wheat ﬂour, corn, soybean meal, and ﬁsh
meal.
Accelerate provisions under the Nontax Revenue Law of May 1997, to
require all oﬀ-budget funds to be incorporated in budget within three
years (instead of ﬁve years).
Incorporate accounts of Investment Fund and Reforestation Fund within
budget.
Ensure reforestation funds used exclusively for ﬁnancing reforestation
programs.
Central government to bear cost of subsidizing credit to small-scale enter-
prises through state banks.
Cancel twelve infrastructure projects.
Discontinue special tax, customs, or credit privileges granted to the Na-
tional Car.
Phase out local content program for motor vehicles.
Abolish compulsory 2 percent after-tax contribution to charity founda-
tions.
Discontinue budgetary and extrabudgetary support and privileges to
IPTN (Nusantara Aircraft Industry) projects.
Conduct revenue review with Fund assistance.
Monetary and Banking Issues
Provide autonomy to BI in formulation of monetary and interest rate pol-
icy.
Publish key monetary data on a weekly basis.
Submit to Parliament a draft law to institutionalize BI’s autonomy.
396 Morris GoldsteinSubmit draft amendment to banking law to Parliament.
Provide autonomy to state banks to adjust interest rates on credit and
deposit liabilities, within any guidelines applying to all banks.
Impose limits on and phase out BI credits to public agencies and public-
sector enterprises.
Strengthen BI’s bank supervision department and strengthen enforcement
of regulations.
Upgrade the reporting and monitoring procedures for foreign exchange
exposures of banks.
Appoint high-level foreign advisors to BI to assist in the conduct of mon-
etary policy.
Set minimum capital requirements for banks of Rp 250 billion by end of
1998, after loan loss provisions.
Reduce the minimum capital requirements for existing banks.
Make loan loss provisions fully tax deductible, after tax veriﬁcation.
Establish program for divestiture of BI’s interests in private banks.
Require all banks to prepare audited ﬁnancial statements.
Require banks to publish regularly more data on their operations.
Lift restrictions on branching of foreign banks.
Submit to Parliament a draft law to eliminate restrictions on foreign
investments in listed banks and amend bank secrecy with regard to non-
performing loans.
Eliminate all restrictions on bank lending except for prudential reasons or
to support cooperatives or small-scale enterprises.
Bank Restructuring
Close sixteen nonviable banks.
Replace the closed banks’ management with liquidation teams.
Compensate small depositors in the sixteen banks.
Place weak regional development banks under intensive supervision by
BI.
Provide liquidity support to banks, subject to increasingly restrictive con-
ditions.
Provide external guarantee to all depositors and creditors of all locally
incorporated banks.
Establish Indonesia Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA).
Determine uniform and transparent criteria for transferring weak banks
to IBRA.
Transfer ﬁfty-four weak banks to IBRA.
Transfer claims resulting from past liquidity support from BI to IBRA.
Transfer to IBRA control of seven banks accounting for more than 75
percent of past BI liquidity support and seven banks that have bor-
rowed more than 500 percent of their capital.
IBRA will continue to take control of or freeze additional banks that fail
IMF Structural Programs 397to meet liquidity or solvency criteria. Where necessary, any such action
will be accompanied by measures to protect depositors or creditors in
line with the government guarantee.
Issue presidential decree to provide appropriate legal powers to IBRA,
including its asset management unit.
Take action to freeze, merge, recapitalize, or liquidate the six banks for
which audits have already been completed.
Establish independent review committee to enhance transparency and
credibility of IBRA operations.
Conduct portfolio, systems, and ﬁnancial reviews of all IBRA banks as well
as major non-IBRA banks by internationally recognized audit ﬁrms.
Conduct portfolio, systems, and ﬁnancial reviews of all other banks by
internationally recognized audit ﬁrms.
Announce plan for restructuring state banks through mergers, transfers of
assets and liabilities, or recapitalization prior to privatization.
Ensure that state banks sign performance contracts, prepared by the
Ministry of Finance with World Bank assistance.
Merge two state-owned banks and conduct portfolio reviews of the two
banks.
Draft legislation enabling state bank privatization.
Introduce private-sector ownership of at least 20 percent in at least one
state bank.
Prepare state-owned banks for privatization.
Develop rules for the Jakarta Clearing House that will transfer settlement
risk from BI to participants.
Introduce legislation to amend the banking law in order to remove the
limit on private ownership of banks.
Introduce deposit insurance scheme.
Establish Financial Sector Advisory Committee to advise on bank restruc-
turing.
Declare insolvency of six private banks intervened in April and write
down shareholder equity.
Issue government bonds to Bank Negara Indonesia at market-related
terms to ﬁnance transfer of deposits of banks frozen in April.
Initiate ﬁrst case of an IBRA bank under the new bankruptcy law.
Foreign Trade
Reduce by 5 percentage points tariﬀs on items currently subject to tariﬀs
of 15 to 25 percent.
Cut tariﬀs on all food items to a maximum of 5 percent.
Abolish local content regulations on dairy products.
Reduce tariﬀs on nonfood agricultural products by 5 percentage points.
Gradually reduce tariﬀs on nonfood agricultural products to a maximum
of 10 percentage points.
398 Morris GoldsteinReduce by 5 percentage points tariﬀs on chemical products.
Reduce tariﬀs on steel/metal products by 5 percentage points.
Reduce tariﬀs on chemical, steel/metal, and ﬁshery products to 5–10 per-
cent.
Abolish import restrictions on all new and used ships.
Phase out remaining quantitative import restrictions and other nontariﬀ
barriers.
Abolish export taxes on leather, cork, ores, and waste aluminum products.
Reduce export taxes on logs, sawn timber, rattan, and minerals to a maxi-
mum of 30 percent by 15 April 1998; 20 percent by end of December
1998; 15 percent by end of December 1999; and 10 percent by end of De-
cember 2000.
Phase-in resource rent taxes on logs, sawn timber, and minerals.
Replace remaining export taxes and levies by resource rent taxes as appro-
priate.
Eliminate all other export restrictions.
Remove ban on palm oil exports and replace by export tax of 40 percent.
The level of the export tax will be reviewed regularly for possible reduc-
tion, based on market prices and the exchange rate, and reduced to 10
percent by end of December 1999.
Investment and Deregulation
Remove the 49 percent limit on foreign investment in listed companies.
Issue a revised and shortened negative list of activities closed to foreign
investors.
Remove restrictions on foreign investment in palm oil plantations.
Lift restrictions on foreign investment in retail trade.
Lift restrictions on foreign investment in wholesale trade.
Dissolve restrictive marketing arrangements for cement, paper, and ply-
wood.
Eliminate price controls on cement.
Allow cement producers to export with only a general exporters license.
Free traders to buy sell and transfer all commodities across district and
provincial boundaries, including cloves, cashew nuts, and vanilla.
Eliminate BPPC (Clove Marketing Board).
Abolish quotas limiting the sale of livestock.
Prohibit provincial governments from restricting trade within and between
provinces.
Enforce prohibition of provincial and local export taxes.
Take eﬀective action to allow free competition in the following:
1. importation of wheat, wheat ﬂour, soybeans, and garlic
2. sale or distribution of ﬂour
3. importation and marketing of sugar
Release farmers from requirements for forced planting of sugar cane.
IMF Structural Programs 399The tale told by table 5.5 and by ﬁgure 5.2 can be summarized as follows.
First, the number of structural policy conditions included in these programs
with the three Asian crisis economies is very large (if not totally unprece-
dented)—many more than you can count using all your ﬁngers and toes.22
Without claiming any precision, my count from publicly available docu-
ments is that these structural policy commitments summed, at their peak,
about 140 in Indonesia, over 90 in Korea, and over 70 in Thailand. Each of
these totals is considerably above the average of about 50-plus for all Fund
programs over the 1996–99 period. Second, in the programs with Korea and
Thailand, the number of structural policy conditions was considerably
smaller at the beginning of the program than at its peak—perhaps because
the country authorities and the Fund ﬁrst laid out the main elements of the
structural reform package and then ﬁlled in the details as they went along,
and because implementation of reforms was pretty good (see discussion be-
low). In contrast, the number of structural policy conditions in the Fund
program with Indonesia hits its peak pretty early on and then declines as
the program period goes on, perhaps reﬂecting an initial eﬀort to impress
the markets with the extent of intended structural reform and then scaling
that back as market reaction proved disappointing and as evidence accu-
mulated that implementation capacity or willingness would be lower than
anticipated. Third, although ﬁnancial-sector restructuring and supervision
is the dominant policy concentration in all three programs, additional data
indicate that the scope of structural policy conditionality is much narrower
in the Korean and Thai programs than in the Indonesian one. Putting aside
the ﬁnancial sector, Thai structural policies are mainly focused on tax and
expenditure reform and on corporate debt restructuring. In Korea, the non-
ﬁnancial areas getting most attention are corporate governance and re-
structuring (and some trade and capital-account liberalization). In Indone-
sia, structural reforms outside the ﬁnancial sector are more of a mixed bag,
with signiﬁcant commitment clusters appearing for privatization and re-
form of public enterprises, for trade systems, for pricing and marketing
policies, for corporate restructuring, and for tax and expenditure reform;
there are also minor clusters for energy and environmental policies and for
social safety nets.
Turning to list C, what is striking is the number, scope, and detail of the
structural policy commitments made by Indonesia, including in nontradi-
tional areas of conditionality. There are, inter alia, measures dealing with
reforestation programs; the phasing-out of local content programs for mo-
tor vehicles; discontinuation of support for a particular aircraft project and
of special privileges granted to the National Car; abolition of the compul-
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22. I hesitate to call the total number of structural policy conditions in even the Indonesian
program “unprecedented” because I am told informally that there was a larger ﬁgure (close to
200) in one of Russia’s programs with the Fund.sory 2 percent after-tax contribution to charity foundations; appointment
of high-level advisors for monetary policy; development of rules for the
Jakarta Clearing House; the end of restrictive marketing agreements for ce-
ment, paper, and plywood; the elimination of the Clove Marketing Board;
the termination of requirements on farmers for the forced planting of sugar
cane; the introduction of a micro credit scheme to assist small businesses;
and the raising of stumpage fees. Enough to say that the great bulk of such
measures were not included because of their macroeconomic impact; they
were presumably included instead for anticorruption reasons, to instill con-
ﬁdence in private investors that the system was changing, to facilitate mon-
itoring of commitments, and (for some commitments) to reﬂect the struc-
tural policy agendas of either other IFIs (the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank) or certain creditor countries (see discussion in section
5.1.4).23
Number of Structural Benchmarks in Fund Programs 
with the Transition Economies
Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskaya (2000) have analyzed the use of
SBMs in Fund programs for twenty-five transition economies over the
1989–97 period. Their tally, also derived from the Fund’s MONA database,
is presented in table 5.6. Three observations merit explicit mention.
First, the average number of SBMs per program is roughly twice as high
in ESAF (twenty-six) and EFF (twenty-three) arrangements and as it is for
standby arrangements (thirteen). Second, although the data in table 5.7are
not directly comparable with those in table 5.1 (not only are the time peri-
ods diﬀerent, but the latter include all structural conditions, whereas the
former include only SBMs), the number of SBMs in standby arrangements
for the transition economies do not seem far out of line (i.e., higher) with
the recent averages for SBAs in all Fund programs—and they are clearly
much lower than the averages on SBMs in the three Asian crisis economies.
Third, there is more variation for SBAs in the number of SBMs (ranging
from one in Bulgaria and Latvia to thirty-ﬁve in Armenia) than for either
ESAF or EFF arrangements.
Figure 5.3, taken from Christiansen and Richter (1999), gives the break-
down by policy area of structural policy conditions for the fund’s programs
with the transition economies.24 The main message is that the most fre-
quently occurring structural conditions were in the area of public-sector
management (institutional reform, tax and revenue policy, expenditure pol-
icy, and public wages and employment). Next in line were restructuring and
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23. Haggard (2000) shares this view.
24. The data used to construct ﬁgure 5.3 are diﬀerent from those used in table 5.8. The for-
mer cover (I think) all structural policy conditions (not just SBMs) and they also cover the
Fund’s initial programs with the transition economies under the (lower-conditionality) Sys-
temic Transformation Facility. These diﬀerences, however, are not important for our purposes.Table 5.6 Number of Structural Benchmarks (SBs) According to Structural
Benchmark Groups for Countries in Transition

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sprivatizations, and ﬁnancial-sector reforms. After that, we see a fairly even
distribution across the remaining areas (energy sector, social safety net,
agricultural sector, trade regime, exchange system, etc.). The top three cat-
egories accounted together for over two-thirds of structural conditions.
Scattered Evidence on Number of Structural Benchmarks 
in Earlier SAF Programs
An unpublished IMF study (1987) of seventeen SAF arrangements (for
low-income countries) in 1986–87 also looked at the number and distribu-
tion of structural benchmarks. The main ﬁndings were that the average
number of SBMs per SAF arrangement was about seven, that there was
considerable variation around this average across programs (ranging from
three in the program for Bolivia to ﬁfteen for Uganda), and that structural
conditions also ranged quite widely across policy areas (covering the ex-
change system, trade liberalization and tariﬀreform, public enterprises, tax
and expenditure policy, producer pricing and agricultural marketing, and
public-sector investment programs).
To sum up, structural policy conditionality is now a common and im-
portant element of Fund conditionality. When prior actions, performance
criteria, structural benchmarks, and conditions for program reviews are
combined, it has been typical (over the past few years) for a one-year
standby arrangement to have on the order of, say, a dozen structural con-
ditions and for a three-year EFF arrangement to have, say, fifty of them.
About two-thirds of those structural conditions are apt to fall in the areas
of ﬁscal policy, ﬁnancial-sector reform, and privatization, with the remain-
der scattered across a fairly wide field. The structural conditions in the
Fund’s much-discussed programs with three Asian crisis economies (In-
donesia, Korea, and Thailand) were much more numerous and detailed
than is usually the case. Financial-sector conditions dominated in all three
of those Asian programs, but detailed conditions in quite a few noncore
structural policy areas were also evident, especially in the case of Indone-
sia. Although much of the external criticism of Fund structural condition-
ality has emphasized the wide scope of the Fund’s involvement (e.g., some
wonder what the Fund has to do with the clove monopoly), our review of
the evidence suggests that the number and speciﬁcity of conditions in core
areas (“micro management”) are at least as important an issue.25
Those analyzing Fund structural policy conditionality, including re-
searchers both inside and outside the Fund, are unanimous in concluding
that there has been a pronounced upward trend in such conditionality
over the past fifteen years, and this trend has probably become steeper in
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25. Saying that the Fund has micromanaged some structural reforms is not the same as say-
ing that such reforms necessarily lack macroeconomic impact. For example, a condition to re-
duce signiﬁcantly the extent of wage indexation could be very detailed but might still carry
macro impact.the 1990s.26 The evidence reported in this section (much of it previously
unpublished) strongly corroborates this conclusion. Finally, there has also
been a shift over time in the instruments used by the Fund to monitor
structural conditionality, with resort to structural benchmarks, condi-
tions for program reviews, and prior actions having risen faster than for-
mal performance criteria. Prior to the 1980s, the Fund was hesitant to ask
for prior actions, and performance reviews regarding structural policies
were exceptional for standby arrangements (see Polak 1991; IMF 1987).
Structural benchmarks were apparently not used prior to the establish-
ment of the SAF in 1986. As demonstrated earlier, all this is no longer the
case. For example, a comparison of the average number of structural con-
ditions for standby arrangements in 1996–99 in table 5.1 with the figures
on structural performance criteria in table 5.2 suggests that, taken to-
gether, structural benchmarks, prior conditions, and program reviews
have recently been about five times as numerous as structural perfor-
mance criteria.
Writing well before Fund programs with the Asian crisis countries, Polak
(1991) contrasted the principles put forth in the 1979 Guidelines on Condi-
tionality with actual practice:
The guidelines do not attempt to change the structure of conditionality:
their aim is limited to making that structure less intrusive by limiting the
number of performance criteria, insisting on their macroeconomic char-
acter, circumscribing the cases for reviews, and keeping preconditions to
a minimum. Yet these restraining provisions have not prevented the in-
tensiﬁcation of conditionality in every direction that the guidelines at-
tempted to block. (61)
Nine years later, it’s hard to disagree with that assessment.
The Eﬀectiveness of Fund Structural Policy Conditionality
If we take it as given that the IMF has become more “grandmotherly” or
intrusive with regard to its structural policy conditionality, the next ques-
tion is how eﬀective such conditionality has been.27 Here, we address just
two aspects of that question: the degree of compliance with Fund condi-
tions and the quality of the Fund policy advice implicitly reﬂected in such
structural policy conditionality. Again, much of the available evidence is of-
ten not in the form best suited to the focus of this paper (that is, it refers to
compliance with, or the eﬀectiveness of, allFund policy conditions, not just
structural policies, or when it deals only with structural policies, it covers
only low-income or transition economies). Nevertheless, some conclusions
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26. See, for example, Tanzi (1987), Polak (1991), Killick (1995), James (1998), Krueger
(1998), Mussa and Savastano (1999), and Gupta et al. (2000).
27. The description of Fund conditionality as being “grandmotherly” is from Keynes; see
James (1998).can be put forward. In addition, some of the recent research on compliance
with structural conditions in Fund programs with the transition economies
is particularly interesting.
Compliance with Fund Policy Conditions
Clearly, Fund policy conditionality cannot have its intended eﬀects if coun-
tries do not implement these policies. Two measures of compliance are typ-
ically found in the literature: the share of IMF loans actually disbursed, and
the degree of compliance with particular Fund policies (e.g., credit ceilings,
budget deﬁcits, various structural benchmarks).28
Table 5.7, adopted from Mussa and Savastano (1999), shows the share of
Fund lending actually disbursed for 615 Fund programs over the 1973–97
period. Although the authors caution that a low disbursement share could
mean the program was so successful—or conditions improved so rapidly—
that the country needed to use only a fraction of the committed IMF fi-
nancing, they conclude that low disbursement cases mainly were ones in
which the program went oﬀ track (because policies deviated significantly
from those agreed upon and subsequent negotiations failed to reach agree-
ment on a modiﬁed program).
Here, it is appropriate to highlight three of the Mussa-Savastano find-
ings. First, if we take, say, disbursement of 75 percent or more of the total
loan as implying close adherence to IMF policy conditionality, then less
than half (45.5 percent) of all Fund arrangements over the entire 1973–97
period would have met that test; see column (6) in table 5.7. Second, again
using the 75 percent or greater benchmark, the completion rate for standby
arrangements (48.5 percent) was notably higher than that for EFF pro-
grams (25.4 percent) with higher average structural policy content; the
completion rate for SAF/ESAF arrangements, which also have a relatively
high structural policy content and deal exclusively with low-income coun-
tries, was much higher than for EFFs and only slightly below that for SBAs.
Third, there is a suggestion that the completion rate for Fund programs is
declining over time.29
A very similar exercise on completion rates was undertaken by Killick
(1995) for 305 Fund programs over the 1979–93 period, with results quite
close to those obtained by Mussa and Savastano (1999). Killick defines a
“completed program” as one that disbursed 80 percent or more of the total
Fund loan. He ﬁnds on this measure that 47 percent of Fund programs were
completed, that the completion rate was higher for SBAs than for EFFs,
that the completion rate was declining over time, and that completion rates
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28. Another potential measure of compliance would be the share of programs that saw an
early conversion of the program to a precautionary arrangement.
29. I use the term “suggestion,” because Mussa and Savastano (1999) note that the results
on completion rates for the 1993–97 period are biased downward due to the inclusion of
arrangements with post-1997 expiration dates.do not diﬀer (in the expected way) on account of cross-country diﬀerences
in either per capita income or type of export.30
Most earlier studies that looked at compliance with particular Fund poli-
cies were restricted to macro conditionality. In brief, Beveridge and Kelly
(1980) and Edwards (1989) found that compliance with monetary or ﬁscal
performance criteria was observed in approximately 48–62 percent of Fund
programs. Polak (1991) updated these results for SBA, EFF, and SAF pro-
grams in the 1980s and found that compliance rates for the 1980s were be-
low those for the 1970s. Killick (1995) cites one unpublished 1991 IMF
study that looked at compliance with structural policies in SAF and ESAF
programs: slightly over half of all structural benchmarks were observed on
schedule (or two-thirds within a few months thereafter), and compliance
was relatively high for agricultural producer pricing and marketing and for
ﬁnancial reforms, and relatively low for ﬁscal provisions (and especially for
public enterprise reforms).
Two more recent studies of compliance with fund structural conditional-
ity have been conducted for the transition economies by Christiansen and
Richter (1999) and Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskaya (2000).31 Four of
their findings are of interest. First, the on-time compliance rate for struc-
tural benchmarks as a group averaged 42 percent, with an additional 16
percent of conditions met with delay; the remaining 42 percent of condi-
tions were not met or no information was available. Second, the compliance
rate for performance criteria (both macro and structural taken together)
was higher than that for structural benchmarks. Third, the correlation be-
tween the number of structural benchmarks in a program and the comple-
tion rate for those structural policies was negative, although neither large
nor statistically signiﬁcant. Fourth, although there was sizable variation in
the compliance rate across structural reform categories, the standard devi-
ation of compliance across countries was more than twice as great as that
for compliance by reform category.32
To sum up, existing studies suggest that obtaining compliance with Fund
conditionality has been a serious problem, including the Fund’s structural
policy conditionality. The compliance problem has been getting more seri-
ous over time. Compliance has been lower for EFF programs than for
standby arrangements (but not apparently for SAF/ESAF programs).
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30. Killick (1995) did ﬁnd some evidence that completion rates were lower for highly in-
debted countries and for those that received relatively low access to Fund resources.
31. A caveat should be noted with respect to studies of the transition economies. Because of
the centrality of structural policies to their reform eﬀorts in the 1990s, their experience with
structural policy conditionality may be “special” and not necessarily transferable to econ-
omies where structural policies occupy a less central role.
32. The on-time compliance rate was highest (57 percent) for public wage and employment
conditions and lowest (29 percent) for price and marketing conditions. Ukraine had the low-
est overall compliance rate (14 percent of structural conditions met on time), while Lithuania
had the highest (82 percent).Compliance has also been lower for structural benchmarks than for perfor-
mance criteria. Correlations between the compliance rate and the number
of structural conditions, along with measures of the variability of compli-
ance across program areas and countries, suggest that greater selectivity
both in the countries approved for structurally oriented programs and in the
structural measures included in such programs could have a high payoﬀ in
terms of compliance rates.33Further studies on a broader sample of coun-
tries would be useful in sharpening these conclusions, including the impor-
tant issue of whether or not the product of the number of structural condi-
tions and the compliance rate is approximately a constant.
Eﬀectiveness of Structural Policy Conditionality
Even if countries consistently complied with Fund structural policy con-
ditions, this would not necessarily constitute an endorsement for such con-
ditionality unless it can be shown that these are “good” structural policy re-
quirements that lead to “better” economic performance. Evidence relevant
for answering that latter query can be gleaned from at least ﬁve sources: (a)
econometric studies that estimate the eﬀects of IMF programs (as a whole)
by comparing program and nonprogram countries or periods; (b) studies
that relate either structural policy action within a Fund program or struc-
tural policy action more generally (whether in Fund programs or otherwise)
to economic growth; (c) studies that relate measures of corporate gover-
nance to the extent of exchange rate depreciation or stock market decline
during the Asian crisis; (d) a comparison of Fund structural policy recom-
mendations with the “consensus” of the economics profession on what
structural policies are good; and (e) a review of the Fund’s structural policy
recommendations in the Asian crisis countries.
Studies on the Eﬀects of IMF Programs as a Whole. By now, there is an ex-
tensive empirical literature on the eﬀects of IMF programs.34 If one deﬁnes
“program eﬀects” as the observed outcome (for growth, inﬂation, the bal-
ance of payments, etc.) relative to the counterfactual (that is, the outcome
in the absence of an IMF program), then it is clear that most of the early lit-
erature had serious methodological ﬂaws (see Goldstein and Montiel 1986).
Before-and-after comparisons are not reliable because they attribute all the
change in outcomes to a Fund program when exogenous shocks and other
inﬂuences may really be causing that change. Comparison of program tar-
gets and outcomes will not be useful when program targets are set too am-
bitiously or not ambitiously enough. Simulations of economic models can
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33. It is relevant to note that the 1979 “Conditionality Guidelines” suggest that the manag-
ing director of the IMF should only recommend that the Fund’s executive board approve a
program when it is his judgment that the program . . . will be carried out”; see Guideline Num-
ber 7 in appendix B.
34. For a recent survey of this literature, see Haque and Khan (1998).tell us something about the eﬀect of Fund-type policies but not about the
eﬀects of actual Fund programs, and comparisons of outcomes for program
and nonprogram countries will not do the job if the two groups diﬀer sys-
tematically in ways that matter for economic performance. Over time, most
of these methodological problems have been addressed. Nowadays, studies
typically seek to identify program eﬀects after controlling both for nonpro-
gram eﬀects and for observed (precrisis) diﬀerences between program and
nonprogram countries.
Still, even the best studies have only indirect implications for the eﬀec-
tiveness of Fund structural policy conditionality since they do not disag-
gregate the contents of a Fund program into its macro and structural pol-
icy components. In any case, what such studies usually find is that Fund
programs have a favorable impact on the current account and overall bal-
ance of payments, that the eﬀect on inflation is statistically insignificant,
and that the eﬀect on economic growth is initially (with the ﬁrst year) neg-
ative but probably turns positive at longer time horizons (see Mussa and
Savastano 1999; Fischer 2000a; Conway 1994); too little econometric work
has been done on income distribution to say much.35
One possible explanation for why such studies do not generate large pos-
itive growth eﬀects for Fund programs is that compliance with the policies
that matter for medium- to long-run growth is far from complete (as
demonstrated above); also, some countries that are in trouble implement
their own policies that are not very diﬀerent from those included in Fund
programs. It has also been argued that even nonprogram countries have
been inﬂuenced by the “silent revolution” in economic thinking on the im-
portance of sound macroeconomic and structural policies and that the
Fund has contributed importantly to this revolution (that is, nonprogram
countries are not a good “control group” because they too are aﬀected by
the policy treatment; see, e.g., Krueger 1998). A second explanation is that
the lags associated with the eﬀects of structural policies on economic
growth are long and, hence, may show up only after the country has left a
Fund program. Yet a third explanation is that the results are right: despite
all the rhetoric on “growth-oriented adjustment,” Fund programs are still
mainly about getting out of financial crises and don’t much matter for
growth in the medium to long run.
Links between Broad Measures of Structural Policy Reform and Growth.This
is a more recent literature, much of it connected with understanding the
economic performance of the transition economies.36
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35. See, however, the recent study by Garuda (2000) who ﬁnds that Fund programs improve
income distribution and poverty reduction for countries with relatively modest precrisis exter-
nal disequilibria but worsen them for countries with severe precrisis external imbalances.
36. There is of course a much broader and older literature on eﬀects of alternative structural-
policy strategies (e.g., Balassa’s [1983] work on outward-looking vs. inward-looking policyOne strand looks at whether greater compliance with Fund structural
policy conditionality is associated with better growth performance. Here,
the recent study by Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskaya (2000) is worth
noting. They find that, after controlling for other factors, those transition
economies that demonstrated higher compliance with IMF structural per-
formance criteria had better records of sustained economic growth (deﬁned
as three consecutive years of positive real GDP growth); in contrast, they
could ﬁnd no signiﬁcant association between compliance with Fund struc-
tural benchmarks and sustained growth. They also report that transition
economies that did better on complying with Fund structural performance
criteria also showed greater progress on implementing structural reform
more generally.37 One interpretation of their first finding is that the (rela-
tively few) structural policies included as performance criteria are more im-
portant for growth than the larger number regarded as structural bench-
marks. The authors concede that some of their results are also consistent
with other views; for example, countries with better growth performance
may find it easier to implement Fund structural conditions, and the un-
observed “commitment to reform” may explain both Fund program imple-
mentation and progress on structural policy action more generally.
The other strand of this literature tests for an association between structural
reform—whether achieved within the context of a Fund program or not—
and economic growth. A good example is the recent study by Havrylyshyn et
al. (1999), which examines the growth experience of twenty-ﬁve transition
economies over the 1990–97 period. After attempting to hold other determi-
nants of growth constant (including initial economic conditions, inﬂation,
size of government, degree of openness, etc.), they ﬁnd that the greater was
progress on an index of overall structural reform, the higher was economic
growth.38They also tested whether individual components of structural re-
form aided growth but found that only price liberalization had signiﬁcant ex-
planatory power when the overall reform index was also included—a ﬁnding
that they interpret as suggesting that it is the combination of structural poli-
cies that is more critical for growth than any single type of policy.
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strategies) and on the determinants of growth in developing countries more generally (e.g.,
Barro [1996]). In addition, there are many studies that take a nonquantitative approach to eval-
uating Fund structural policies; see, for example, Schadler et al. (1995a), who (looking at Fund
programs during the 1988–92 period) concluded that “there was a broad measure of success in
accomplishing structural reform” (29).
37. Progress on structural reform is measured using a structural reform index, derived from
De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb [1996] and EBRD Transition reports. This index is meant to cap-
ture liberalization of prices and foreign exchange markets, small and large-scale privatization,
governance and restructuring reforms, legal reforms, interest rate liberalization, and banking
reforms; see Havrylyshyn et al. [1999].
38. Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh (1996) reached a similar conclusion in an earlier paper on the
growth experience of the transition economies. Because there are very few transition econ-
omies that have not had a program with the IMF, a comparison of program and nonprogram
countries is not a viable research strategy.A similar growth exercise for eighty-four low- and middle-income coun-
tries during the 1981–95 period is summarized in IMF (1997). In these
pooled, cross-section regressions, the authors ﬁnd that after controlling for
other determinants of per capita GDP growth, improved macroeconomic
policies and improved structural policies both have signiﬁcant eﬀects on
growth in the expected direction. They also conclude that behavior of
growth in ESAF countries does not diﬀer fundamentally from that in other
developing countries.
Corporate Governance and the Asian Financial Crisis. As suggested earlier,
there has been much discussion of the role that governance and corruption
issues played in the Asian ﬁnancial crisis. A new study by Johnson et al.
(2000) provides some interesting empirical results and insights. The authors
look at the behavior of nominal exchange rates and stock markets from the
end of 1996 through January 1999 for twenty-ﬁve emerging economies.
Their aim was to see if cross-country diﬀerences in measures of corporate
governance (e.g., judicial eﬃciency, corruption, rule of law, protection for
minority shareholders, creditor rights, etc.) could do a better job at ex-
plaining the extent of exchange rate depreciation and stock market decline
than could standard macroeconomic measures (e.g., ﬁscal and monetary
policy, current account imbalances, international reserves, foreign debt,
etc.). In brief, they ﬁnd that the corporate governance horse does better
than the macroeconomic horse, particularly for stock market movements.
They argue that institutions that protect investor rights are not important
as long as growth lasts (because managers do not want to steal). However,
when growth prospects decline and there is even a small loss of investor con-
ﬁdence, countries with only weakly enforceable minority shareholder rights
become particularly vulnerable. This is because outside investors reassess
the likely amount of expropriation by managers and adjust the amount of
capital they are willing to provide (resulting in a fall of asset values and a
collapse of the exchange rate). On some of Johnson et al.’s measures of cor-
porate governance—particularly rights of minority shareholders—several
Asian crisis countries (particularly Indonesia and Thailand) ranked low
and hence were more vulnerable to the eﬀects of a downturn.
Fund Structural Policy Conditionality and the “Consensus.”In 1983 at a con-
ference on IMF conditionality, Richard Cooper [1983] oﬀered the follow-
ing view: “we could choose any ﬁve people present and make a team to work
up an economic adjustment program for a particular country other than
our own . . . [and] the program we came up with would not diﬀer greatly
from a typical IMF program” (571).
I am more skeptical that we could make the same statement today, at least
about Fund programs for the Asian crisis countries. Nevertheless, I would
still maintain that the general thrust of the Fund’s structural policy recom-
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has labeled “the Washington policy consensus.” Whether it is interest rate
deregulation, trade liberalization, tax reform, the currency regime, foreign
direct investment, price liberalization, or banking reform, Fund structural
policy advice is typically not far from the consensus. Writing fifteen years
after Cooper, Anne O. Krueger (1998, p. 1998) oﬀers a similar assessment:
Many of the lending changes supported by the Bank and the Fund (in,
for example, exchange rates, size of ﬁscal deﬁcits, trade liberalization,
agricultural and energy price reforms, privatization, and tax reform) are
ones that would be endorsed in broad outline, if not in detail, by almost
all economists.
But saying that the Fund’s structural policy advice has generally reﬂected
the profession’s consensus view does not mean that this advice has not at
times gone seriously astray. Three examples illustrate the point. First, along
with several of its larger G7 shareholders (particularly the United States
and the United Kingdom), the Fund often pushed hard on emerging econ-
omies to undertake capital account liberalization without due regard to
theadequacy of the host country’s regulatory and supervisory framework.39
In Korea, for instance, the Fund apparently urged liberalization of both
short-term and long-term flows. However, when the Koreans said they
would only go for the former, the Fund apparently regarded this as better
than nothing and accepted it.40A second example concerns Fund advice on
privatization in transition economies. There, the IMF (2000) acknowledges
that privatization runs the danger of producing perverse results in the ab-
sence of hard budget constraints, competition, and eﬀective standards of
corporate governance. As with capital account liberalization, a more selec-
tive approach to privatization with greater attention to sequencing would,
with the beneﬁt of hindsight, have been better. Yet a third example was the
initial Fund recommendation in Indonesia to go with a limited deposit
guarantee for banks rather than a blanket guarantee.41 In drawing the les-
sons of the Asian crisis, the Fund (Lindgren et al. 1999) now concludes that
in a systemic crisis a blanket guarantee is needed to restore conﬁdence in the
ﬁnancial system.42
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39. One of the few observers who stated publicly his concerns (before the crisis) about the
magnitude of short-term capital inﬂows going into Asian emerging economies was Park
(1996).
40. In appraising Fund structural policy recommendations made in the late 1980s, Schadler
et al. (1995a, 31) similarly conclude: “Coordinated programs for structural reforms would have
been desirable but were generally not politically or administratively feasible. It is appropriate,
therefore, that programs supported the second-best strategy of seizing opportunities for re-
form on as broad a front as possible. This process cannot give a large role to sequencing con-
siderations, but these are not unambiguous and could unduly slow the process.”
41. A comprehensive guarantee was introduced in Indonesia two months later.
42. As suggested below, I do not share this view on the use of blanket guarantees, but I think
most others do.Fund Structural Policy Conditionality in the Asian Crisis Countries.Because
the heart of Fund structural policy conditionality in the Asian crisis coun-
tries dealt with the ﬁnancial sector, and because there is already a separate
paper at this conference focused on financial policies in emerging econ-
omies, I will confine my remarks on the Fund’s structural policy recom-
mendations to four points.
First, I ﬁnd the underlying rationale for dealing immediately with insol-
vent and weak banking and ﬁnance companies compelling. Without such
action, it probably would have been impossible to restore monetary and
currency stability (because large-scale liquidity support to insolvent insti-
tutions would have worked at cross purposes), and the ﬁscal tab for bank re-
capitalization would have been even higher than it has turned out to be (be-
cause managers of insolvent institutions would have engaged in more
“gambling for resurrection”). Moreover, I don’t think conﬁdence could
have been restored without some concrete evidence that ﬁnancial-sector su-
pervision (including transparency and disclosure) was going to be started
on a diﬀerent path for the future than it had been on in the past. Similarly,
to show that cronyism and corruption would henceforth be less prevalent,
it was important (at least in Indonesia) to take a few visible privileges or
sweetheart deals away from those close to President Suharto. Once the cri-
sis deepened and nonperforming loans of banks and corporate insolvencies
became larger and more widespread, it also became evident that banks and
corporates—particularly in Thailand and Indonesia—would not simply be
able to grow out of it without restructuring. Because of strong links between
banks and corporates (especially in Korea and Indonesia), as well as the
need to cushion somewhat the most vulnerable groups from the eﬀects of
the crisis, there was a good case for including some corporate reforms (e.g.,
reduction of debt-equity ratios by the chaebol) and some social safety net
provisions in those programs.
Second, notwithstanding the above argument, there were elements of
structural conditionality in the three Fund programs with Indonesia, Korea,
and Thailand that seem superfluous. I don’t find persuasive the argument
that trade liberalization measures in the Indonesian and Korean programs
were necessary to prevent a slide toward protectionism (see Hamann and
Schulze-Ghattas 1999). A better rationale would be that trade liberalization
was needed to increase competition and to help discipline ineﬃcient domes-
tic producers. However, that still doesn’t explain why trade liberalization
needed to be done immediately rather than after the crisis. Likewise, I don’t
see why the Indonesian program had to be so sweeping with respect to the
dismantling of state monopolies and cartels, elimination of restrictive mar-
keting agreements, abolition of showcase projects, and the like, disagreeable
as those practices were. For conﬁdence reasons, a few “candies” may have
had to be taken away from cronies at the outset, but the rest of the box (and,
admittedly, it was a very big box) could have waited for later. In the Korean
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have waited until after the crisis. Additionally, in Thailand (which had the
narrowest of the three programs), it’s hard to see why privatization of state
enterprises, removal of the real estate tax on foreign purchases of condo-
miniums, and a new land act needed to be part of the Fund’s conditions.
Moving from the width to the depth of conditionality, the level of detail
reﬂected in the structural benchmarks for these three programs likewise
seems excessive. For example, in Indonesia, was it necessary to have ﬁve
commitments for reform of oil and gas policy, and eighteen commitments
for follow-up actions to the ﬁndings of the audit of Bank Indonesia? In Ko-
rea, was it essential to have eleven commitments for restructuring, for in-
vestment guidelines, and for corporate governance of insurance compa-
nies? In Thailand, did six target dates have to be set up to guide the
privatization of Bangkok Metropolitan and Siam City banks? More gener-
ally, did supervisory and prudential measures for ﬁnancial institutions in
the three crisis countries have to be speciﬁed so precisely? Wouldn’t, say, a
broader commitment to implement the Basel Core Principles of Eﬀective
Banking Supervision by date x, along with a few benchmark checks of good
progress, be as eﬀective (and less intrusive) and, in addition, carry the seal
of approval of the world’s key banking supervisors? Couldn’t the Fund pro-
vide its very detailed views on ways of improving corporate governance as
technical assistance, not as conditions in the Fund program? Yes, this
would require more faith that the crisis country would want on its own to
“do the right thing.” However, if it doesn’t really want to implement the
reforms, then very detailed monitoring via a very large set of structural
benchmarks may not push the ball much farther ahead. Besides, unlike per-
formance criteria, failure to meet many of the structural benchmarks does
not carry the automatic threat of interruption of fund ﬁnancing.
Third, I don’t agree with either the Fund or many of its critics that the In-
donesian experience leads to the lesson that bank restructuring during a
systemic banking crisis can only be accomplished successfully if blanket
guarantees are issued by the government (see Lindgren et al. 1999). The
closing of banks in Indonesia led to runs because the authorities were only
willing to close a subset of a much wider group of insolvent banks, because
high-level political support (from President Suharto and some others) for
the initial bank closures was absent, and because the Fund agreed to a bad
compromise. When there are widespread bank insolvencies, the key to
restoring confidence is to convince the public that all the bad banks have
been closed or resolved, that the remainder are solid, and that small retail
depositors (not everybody) will be covered.43As a former colleague of mine
put it, “people don’t run banks that are closed; they run banks that are open
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43. Ways to limit moral hazard without negating the beneﬁts of deposit insurance are dis-
cussed in Financial Stability Forum (2000).that they think will soon be closed.” Also, when there is no deposit insur-
ance in place or the insurance system is not viewed as credible, the necessity
is for the bank supervisory authority to replace the old management of in-
solvent banks with a new one (so as to prevent “double-or-nothing” behav-
ior and even larger credit losses), and to eventually dock the shareholders
(so as to penalize the owners and to limit moral hazard); such insolvent
banks can then be resolved in a variety of ways (even while they honor with-
drawals and take deposits). What’s not necessary—and can prompt runs—
is to board up the teller cages of some banks (while other questionable
banks remain open). The real lesson of the Indonesian experience is that a
sensible, incentive-compatible deposit insurance system (along the lines of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act [FDICIA] in
the United States) should be a permanent part of the ﬁnancial infrastruc-
ture in all countries; without it, governments wind up providing ex post de-
posit insurance, but they do it at higher current cost and with moral hazard
eﬀects that increase the likelihood of future banking crises.
In much the same spirit, I disagree with those who say that bank capital
requirements should have been phased in even more slowly in the Asian cri-
sis countries so as to prevent a credit crunch. A cutback in lending exposure
is an equilibrium response of a bank to a negative shock that reduces its cap-
ital. The relevant question is not whether one likes a credit crunch; it is
whether one prefers some credit crunch to an expansion of lending—much
of which is likely to go to the same insolvent borrowers that were at the root
of the banks’ diﬃculties (leading to even larger bank losses). To be sure,
there was a fall-oﬀ in real credit supply in late 1997 and early 1998 in most
of the crisis countries, and undoubtedly some “good” borrowers were also
denied credit. However, there was also a fall in real credit demand that ap-
parently was sharper than the fall in supply (at least in Korea and Thailand;
see Ghosh and Ghosh 1999; Lane et al. 1999). In addition, there is some ev-
idence that the allocation of bank credit improved (see Borenzstein and Lee
2000). In the end, I doubt we would have obtained a better combined score
on economic activity and on bank losses if capital requirements had been
less binding during 1998–2000.
Drawing on a sample of thirty-four countries (twenty-seven of them de-
veloping or transition economies) that have experienced signiﬁcant ﬁscal
costs from bank failures over the 1970–2000 period, Honohan and Klinge-
biel (2000) compare “regulatory forbearance” versus “strict” approaches to
crisis resolution. They ﬁnd that unlimited deposit guarantees, open-ended
liquidity support, repeated recapitalizations, debtor bailouts, and regula-
tory forbearance add signiﬁcantly and sizably to costs. One of their main
conclusions bears repeating:
Our ﬁndings clearly tilt the balance in favor of a “strict” approach to cri-
sis resolution, rather than an accommodating one. At the very least, they
416 Morris Goldsteinemphasize that regulatory authorities which [sic] choose an accommo-
dating or gradualist approach to an emerging crisis need to be sure that
they have some other way of controlling risk. (19)
Fourth, compliance with the Fund’s structural policy conditionality ap-
pears to have been much better than the average (for all Fund programs) in
Korea and in Thailand but not so in Indonesia. A good deal of progress has
been made on ﬁnancial-sector rebuilding and reform, but much still re-
mains to be done. Moreover, it is still too early to know whether the exces-
sively close relationship between large business and government that has
been the source of so much ineﬃciency and favoritism has changed funda-
mentally for the better.
It’s not easy (especially for an outsider) to measure compliance with struc-
tural policy conditions because the Fund programs with the three crisis
countries were revised often over the 1997–2000 period and because some
structural benchmarks have been dropped or added from one revision to the
next. Still, suppose we define “compliance” as having met a condition
within, say, three months of the target date. Then my ballpark estimate
would be that Korea has complied with about 90 percent of the structural
conditions laid out in the Fund’s program.44 The corresponding compliance
ﬁgure for Thailand would be about 70 percent. Two areas where compliance
was weak in Thailand were reform of state banks and privatization of public
enterprises. The calculation for Indonesia is subject to the largest margin of
error but probably falls in the 20–40 percent range. In Indonesia, compliance
with structural conditions has been seriously handicapped by prolonged
political instability and by a weak approach by the government toward debt-
ors; compliance has been lower in noncore policy areas than in core areas.
The problem with looking only at the share of structural conditions met
is not only that some are more important than others: it is also that most
structural policy conditions capture processes that do not necessarily have
a tight link with outcomes. For example, if the structural benchmark says
you must have two outside directors appointed to a corporate board, that
can be done, but the outside appointees may not diﬀer much from their
predecessors. Or a loan can be restructured, but in a way that doesn’t much
reduce the present discounted value of the borrower’s debt burden. For this
reason, it is useful to look at some other, less process-oriented benchmarks
for the ﬁnancial and corporate sectors.
As background, we should recall that the three crisis countries (as a
group) experienced a sharp output recovery in 1999 and 2000; inﬂation is
mostly under control, and their current accounts are in surplus (albeit much
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44. During a visit to South Korea in May 2000, I met with many Korean oﬃcials who had
been involved in the crisis negotiations with the Fund. My overall impression is that most of
the structural conditions included in the Fund program had been on the domestic reform
agenda for a long time and thus were not viewed as “imposed” on Korea. This may explain in
part why the compliance rate with structural conditions has been so high.reduced from the huge current-account surpluses of 1998); see table 5.8. In
addition, they have much lower ratios of short-term external debt to inter-
national reserves than immediately preceding the crisis; they have aban-
doned publicly declared exchange rate targets; and both nonperforming
loans in the banking system and corporate insolvencies are retreating from
their peaks. They are moving in the right direction—albeit too slowly—on
banking supervision and corporate governance. Additionally, in Korea, the
debt-equity ratios for most of the largest chaebol have declined sharply.
Turning to the negative side of the ledger, equity prices have declined
sharply throughout emerging Asia (with the notable exception of China);
the expected growth slowdown in the United States meant that export
growth of the crisis countries was likely to be much lower (by roughly half)
in 2001 than it was in 2000; volatile oil prices are a source of great uncer-
tainty; the high public debt burden in Indonesia and the large ﬁscal deﬁcit
in Thailand limit the scope for countercyclical ﬁscal policy; bank lending to
the private sector has been weak outside Korea; Japan’s recovery remains
both anemic and fragile; and there has been some political turbulence in the
region (the Philippines and Taiwan).
Table 5.9, taken from Claessens, Djankov, and Klingebiel (1999), pro-
vides a summary of ﬁnancial restructuring in the three crisis countries, at
least as of mid-1999. Although there have been later developments, a num-
ber of their ﬁndings merit mention.
Korea has used a combination of recapitalizations, nationalizations,
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Table 5.8 Asian Crisis Countries: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, and Current
Account Balance
Real GDP Consumer Prices Current Account Balances
(annual % change) (annual % change) (as % of GDP)
Indonesia
1998 –13.0 58.0 4.2
1999 0.3 20.8 3.7
2000a 4.5 3.3 6.5
2001a 4.2 5.6 5.3
Korea
1998 –6.7 7.5 12.8
1999 10.7 0.8 6.1
2000a 9.0 2.4 2.6
2001a 5.0 3.5 1.7
Thailand
1998 –10.2 8.1 12.7
1999 4.2 0.3 9.1
2000a 5.5 1.6 7.7
2001a 4.0 2.3 9.4
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.removal of bad debt, and mergers to strengthen its banking system.45 How-
ever, it was much less active against weak nonbanks and has had to clean up
a mess with those investment trusts that rushed in to ﬁnance the chaebol(es-
pecially Daewoo) after the banks cut back. Thailand has closed about two-
thirds of its ﬁnance companies but has gone more slowly on bank restruc-
turing, asking the banks to raise their own capital and making public
money subject to stricter prudential and management changes. Indonesia,
after a large, initial liquidity injection to banks, has gotten less far on bank
restructuring than the others.
Banks are still undercapitalized—moderately in Korea, more so in Thai-
land, and extremely so in Indonesia. Nonperforming loans are still very
high in Thailand and Indonesia. Korean banks may be able to cover their
capital shortfalls from earnings; this is not so with either Thai or Indone-
sian banks. Korea and Thailand have made some governance and manage-
ment changes in their banks, Indonesian banks much less so.
Korea and Thailand have restructured about one-half and one-third, re-
spectively, of corporate debt, the bulk of it in out-of-court settlement; the
corresponding ﬁgure for Indonesia is roughly one-sixth. Although corpo-
rations have beneﬁted from the recovery, about one-quarter of Thai ﬁrms
and over half of Indonesian ones cannot meet interest payments out of op-
erational cash ﬂows.
Despite quite signiﬁcant increases in foreign direct investment, all three
Asian economies have seen their public debt rise appreciably as a result of
ﬁnancial restructuring costs. Public debt is about equal to gross domestic
product (GDP) in Indonesia and is more than one-third of it in both Korea
and Thailand (having risen from very low precrisis ratios). 
Gains have been made in the quality of ﬁnancial regulation, but it still
trails best international practice. So far, Korea and Thailand have come far-
ther than Indonesia on this score. Corporate ownership is still very concen-
trated among the top ﬁfteen families in all three countries. Corporate gov-
ernance is changing, but a weak judicial system in Indonesia and a poor
bankruptcy law in Thailand have limited the advances.46
Last but not least, because of heavy government intervention into the ﬁ-
nancial system during the crisis (nationalizations, purchase of bad assets,
etc.) the government now owns a huge share—about 50 percent on average
for the three countries—of total banking assets. Because governments do
not do well owning and managing banks, there is a strong need for much
larger divestitures (including sales to foreigners) than have occurred to date.47
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45. In late September 2000, the Korean Government announced that it would be putting in
an additional $44 billion of public funds to deal with bad loans of the banking system.
46. Other analysts (e.g., Root [2000] and Spencer [2000]) have pointed to the low number of
aﬃliate sales by the chaebol and the recent rescue of Hyundai Engineering and Construction
as disappointments in the Korean reform eﬀort.
47. See Root (2000) on why a more decentralized approach to ﬁnancial restructuring in Ko-
rea would yield better results than a government-dominated strategy.To sum up, studies of the eﬀects of Fund programs show that they have
positive eﬀects on the current account and overall balance of payments;
eﬀects on growth, inflation, and income distribution have proved to be
much harder to pin down with any precision. Those transition economies
that have done more on implementing Fund structural performance crite-
ria appear to have done better on economic growth and structural policy re-
form more generally than those with weaker compliance records. Those
emerging economies with better corporate governance structures in place
prior to the outbreak of Asian crisis were, on average, hit less hard with cur-
rency and stock market declines during the crisis than those with a poorer
track record on corporate governance. For the most part, Fund structural
policy recommendations reflect the economics profession’s consensus of
what constitutes sensible structural policy reform, although some serious
mistakes on the sequencing of reforms have sometimes taken place. The
core of the Fund’s structural policy conditionality in the three Asian crisis
countries—which focused mainly on financial-sector crisis management
and restructuring—was appropriate, with the exception of the bad com-
promise made on bank closures in Indonesia. That said, the Fund’s struc-
tural conditionality in the Asian crisis countries (and especially in Indone-
sia) appears excessive—both in scope and in detail. Thus far, compliance
with that conditionality has been high in Korea, above average in Thailand,
and below average in Indonesia. Looking at a broader array of indicators,
progress on restructuring in East Asia is evident but much more needs to be
done to put banks and corporates on a sound footing. It is too early to tell
whether the past close relationship between government and business has
changed fundamentally for the better.
5.1.4 How Did Fund Structural Policy Conditionality Get to be This Way?
If one concludes that Fund structural policy conditionality has become
more intrusive than necessary, it is relevant to speculate on how it might have
gotten that way. In my view, nine factors have contributed to that trend.48
First, in the 1970s and early 1980s, IMF programs came under sharp crit-
icism from many developing countries as being too demand-oriented and
too short-run and as not paying enough attention to economic growth, to
supply-side reforms, and to income distribution. The disappointing growth
performance of developing countries in the early 1980s added to those con-
cerns. Because developing countries increasingly constituted the demand
for Fund resources, neither the Fund nor creditor governments could eas-
ily dismiss that criticism. New lending windows with higher structural pol-
icy content and with lending terms more favorable to low-income countries
were created, and monitoring techniques for gauging compliance with
structural policy conditions evolved.
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48. Several of these factors are discussed in Allen (1993).Second, the expansion of the IMF’s surveillance responsibilities—
agreed upon in the mid-1970s under the second amendment of the Fund’s
charter and given expression in the revised Article IV—permitted Fund Ar-
ticle IV country missions to take a wider field of view in evaluating eco-
nomic developments and prospects. Structural problems thus came under
greater scrutiny. This greater familiarity with structural problems may in
turn have led to a greater readiness to include structural policy conditions
in programs, at least in those cases in which structural weaknesses were per-
ceived, rightly or wrongly, to have been linked to crisis vulnerability.
Third, the huge transformation task faced by the transition economies—
especially in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s—made structural policies and the
building of a market infrastructure the name of the game in that region.
And the IMF (along with the European Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment) was at the center of the technical assistance and policy lending
to those transition economies. Again, structural benchmarks came to be re-
lied upon as a way of monitoring structural policy conditionality across a
wide front. When structural problems arose in later crises (such as that in
Asia), the same monitoring techniques were applied.
Fourth, all the while, the Fund was more and more interpreting its man-
date as broader than just promoting macroeconomic and ﬁnancial stability
and helping countries to manage financial crises. From the mid-1980s on,
economic growth and, later, high-quality growth were given increased
prominence. After the Mexican peso crisis of 1994–95, crisis prevention—
with particular attention to strengthening ﬁnancial systems at the national
level and developing international standards and codes of good practice—
too moved up on the agenda.
Fifth, crises that involve severe balance sheet problems of banks and
private corporations lead to more structural policy intensive fund programs
than do those that stem from traditional monetary and ﬁscal policy ex-
cesses—and the Asian crises of 1997–98 had those balance sheet problems
in spades. The IMF’s executive board also seems to have sent staﬀ the mes-
sage (in 1997) that lending into serious governance and corruption prob-
lems (without any measures to address them) would not receive board sup-
port. In the Indonesian program, a decision was made to try to impress the
markets with the comprehensiveness of the reform eﬀort.
Sixth, the long-standing and growing problem of obtaining good com-
pliance with Fund programs led over time to greater reliance on prior ac-
tions and to more wide-ranging and detailed structural policy conditions,
presumably in an eﬀort to penalize poor earlier track records, to thwart eva-
sion, and to detect slippage at an earlier stage.49If this broader and more de-
tailed conditionality didn’t produce higher compliance and the amount of
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49. Failure to implement earlier Fund recommendations can over time push up structural
conditionality even when some of those recommendations come in the form of technical as-
sistance rather than as conditions in Fund programs.structural reform hoped for, maybe the Fund concluded that it was still in-
ducing more structural reform than would obtain with lesser Fund struc-
tural policy conditionality. The Fund’s Guidelines for Conditionality—which
might have reined in excessive structural policy conditionality—came to be
viewed by the Fund’s executive board as broad principles of intention, not
as something to be monitored carefully and enforced.
Seventh, in the meantime, a wide array of legislative groups, nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs), and even other international ﬁnancial or-
ganizations came to see an IMF letter of intent as the preferred instrument
of leverage for their own agendas in emerging economies. Yes, the Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO) might be the logical place to push core
labor standards, but it doesn’t have the teeth of an IMF program. Simul-
taneously, various G7 governments—and particularly the Fund’s largest
shareholder—were finding it increasingly diﬃcult to get congressional
support for “clean” IMF funding bills. Reﬂecting this congressional pres-
sure from both major parties, the U.S. executive director at the Fund has
been obliged to support with voice and vote a long list of structural policies
(ranging from protection of the environment to promotion of economic
deregulation and privatizing of industry), and the U.S. Treasury (2000a) is
required to report annually to Congress on its compliance with relevant
sections of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Pro-
grams Appropriation Act of 1999. A reading of that report (U.S. Treasury
2000a) confirms that the United States frequently pushed for policies in
fund programs that were far from the Fund’s core competence. Likewise,
in countries where there was prolonged use of Fund resources, IMF letters
of intent sometimes became an instrument of leverage that the finance
ministry could use in order to push structural reforms on other depart-
ments in the government that were opposed. In short, everybody has got-
ten in on the act.
Eighth, unlike other IFIs, the Fund and the World Bank have suﬃcient
“ground troops” to make on-site visits to all countries. In addition, at least
in oﬃcial circles, the Fund has developed a reputation as being able to act
quickly and eﬃciently. When new structural challenges have arisen, there
has therefore been a tendency to say, “give it to the Fund; they go there any-
way; have them just add a few specialists on problem x to the mission.” The
management of the Fund has apparently not said “no” very often to those
demands.
Finally, there have been occasions—the Korean and Indonesian pro-
grams are important cases in point—when strong pressure from particular
G7 governments (during program negotiations) resulted in the inclusion of
specific structural policies in a Fund program, and this despite the provi-
sion in the Fund’s charter (IMF 1988, 42, Article XII, section IV) for each
member country of the Fund to “refrain from all attempts to influence
any of the [Fund] staﬀ in the discharge of [their] functions.”
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The Fund’s new managing director, Horst Kohler, has already indicated
that he thinks that the Fund “has been overstretched in the past and needs
to refocus” (Kohler 2000c, 3); he has also ﬂagged his intention to end “mis-
sion creep,” in large part by streamlining structural policy conditionality. To
carry out that objective, there are at least eight approaches (not all of them
mutually exclusive) worth mentioning.
Structural Preconditions
This radical approach, favored by the majority of the Meltzer Commis-
sion (see IFIAC 2000), would jettison ex post IMF conditionality in favor
of a small number of preconditions, namely, freedom of entry and opera-
tion for foreign ﬁnancial institutions, regular and timely publication of the
maturity structure of outstanding sovereign and guaranteed debt and oﬀ–
balance sheet liabilities, adequate capitalization of commercial banks, and
a proper ﬁscal requirement.50 Developing countries that met these precon-
ditions would be eligible immediately for short-term liquidity assistance;
those developing countries that did not meet them would not be eligible.
Objections to this approach have been registered on three counts (see
Bergsten et al. 2000).
Although meeting these preconditions would reduce the risk of getting
into a crisis, they would hardly be suﬃcient for crisis prevention. Although
many currency and debt crises begin in the banking sector, quite a few oth-
ers do not, and freedom of entry plus a capital requirement are not good
substitutes for the broader range of measures outlined in the Basel Core
Principles of Eﬀective Banking Supervision.51 The fiscal policy precondi-
tion is not deﬁned in the report, and making it operational would be subject
to the same kind of negotiation and intrusiveness as with present Fund con-
ditionality.
More fundamentally, even if satisﬁed, these preconditions would not get
a country out of a balance-of-payments crisis once it got into one. Without
measures to reduce absorption and to switch expenditure from foreign to
domestic goods, the crisis country’s ability to repay would not improve.
Moreover, giving large Fund loans to a country with a runaway inﬂation or
a huge budget deﬁcit would increase moral hazard, not reduce it.
Last but not least, it is highly questionable whether the international
community would be willing to exclude completely from IMF financing
countries that didn’t meet these preconditions, particularly when a new gov-
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50. At present, the only Fund lending window that uses prequaliﬁcation is the Contingency
Credit Line (CCL). However, since its inception in 1999, no country has yet come forward to
use it.
51. Garber (2000) has argued that a subordinated debt requirement for banks a la the
Meltzer Report could easily be manipulated and evaded.ernment promised policies diﬀerent from its predecessor.52 For this reason,
the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force (1999) rejected the “all-or-
nothing” approach and opted instead to penalize (reward) countries that
have followed poor (good) policies by charging them higher (lower) interest
rates when they needed to borrow from the Fund.
Collateralized Fund Lending
Another radical approach to reducing or eliminating Fund structural
policy conditionality would have the fund follow the Bagehot (1873) guide-
line and lend on good collateral (see Meltzer 1999; Feldstein 1999). Good
collateral is meant to serve several purposes. It provides a test of whether
the borrower is just illiquid rather than insolvent (a solvent borrower has
good collateral to pledge; an insolvent one does not); it safeguards the sol-
vency of the lender; and it reduces (borrower) moral hazard by discourag-
ing the borrower from holding risky assets that would not be accepted as
good collateral.
Opposition to the collateral proposal emanates from several arguments.
If eligible collateral is deﬁned narrowly and strictly (say, holdings of U.S.
government securities), then it will not provide much additional advantage
in crisis management (since countries so endowed wouldn’t need to come to
the Fund—they could borrow from private markets). Pledging collateral to
the Fund might also run afoul of “negative pledge” clauses in existing loan
agreements, and even if it didn’t, its favorable impact would be limited be-
cause it would raise borrowing costs on the noncollateralized debt. Some
would contend too that liquidating the collateral (say, export receipts) in the
event of repayment problems (stemming either from bad luck or poor pol-
icy performance) would subject the Fund to even harsher criticism from
developing-country borrowers than it receives when it interrupts disburse-
ment under a Fund program. Would the United States, for example, have
been able politically to cash in the collateral (oil receipts) pledged by Mex-
ico during the 1994–95 peso crisis if things had not worked out so well for
Mexico in 1995?
Deﬁne Conditionality in Terms of Outcomes, 
Not Structural Policies or Benchmarks
The idea here would be for the Fund to leave the process by which coun-
tries respond to crises up to them and instead condition Fund assistance on
positive changes in certain outcomes. For example, instead of making
changes in the judicial system or the establishment of a new framework for
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52. See Polak (1991). U.S. Treasury (2000b) argues that these preconditions would have pre-
cluded the IMF from responding to ﬁnancial emergencies in the vast majority of its member
countries, including all the Asian crisis countries.corporate debt restructuring conditions of the program for Indonesia, the
Fund could just say that half of the nonperforming corporate debt has to be
rescheduled by date x. If the country meets the target, it gets the money;
otherwise, it doesn’t.
The rub here is that performance criteria are normally conﬁned to vari-
ables that are under the control of the borrower. The diﬃculty with deﬁning
structural conditionality in terms of outcomes is that exogenous develop-
ments could aﬀect the borrower’s ability to meet the target. Consequently,
there would be many demands for waivers. In addition, outcomes are often
not easy to deﬁne for some structural policies (e.g., what is “good” banking
supervision, or what constitutes a “restructured” loan). Finally, one of the
main purposes of the Fund is to rule certain crisis management processes
(e.g., increased resort to trade restrictions) as out of bounds.
Put Restrictions or Penalties on Foreign-Currency Borrowing
If much of structural policy conditionality comes from balance sheet
problems of banks and corporates and the latter, in turn, often derive from
the buildup of large currency mismatches, why not attack the problem at its
source by seeking to discourage foreign-currency borrowing (see Krueger
2000; Dooley 1999)? Presumably, a key reason why Brazil has had a much
milder crisis than the Asian countries is that currency mismatching in Brazil
was better controlled; hence, when the real crashed, there were many fewer
banking and corporate insolvencies. Although (enlightened) government
borrowers ought to be able to internalize these externalities, this is not so for
private borrowers, who may expect either a government bailout (if things go
badly) or who may be driven to take up the cheaper foreign-currency loan
because competitors are doing it. Although timely publication of aggregate
data on currency and maturity mismatching may improve market disci-
pline, some have proposed going much farther. Krueger, for example, has
suggested that foreign-currency obligations incurred by domestic residents
of emerging economies be made unenforceable in domestic courts. Others
have argued that the currency mismatching problem is a powerful argument
in favor of dollarization.
One counterargument is that such measures are too drastic for the problem
at hand. If currency mismatching is the problem, why not have the govern-
ment develop better hedging mechanisms (e.g., futures exchanges), as Mex-
ico has been doing since it moved to a ﬂoating rate? Others might say that giv-
ing up (via dollarization) the potential advantage of access to easy monetary
policy during a severe recession just to minimize the risk of one particular
type of crisis is allowing the tail to wag the dog. Enforcement of currency-
matching restrictions could also be a problem. In today’s world of structured
derivatives, what looks like a domestic-currency loan could well have embed-
ded options that amount to an unhedged bet on the exchange rate.
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Instead of custom-tailoring structural conditions to a particular crisis
situation or particular ﬁnancial institutions, the fund and its member coun-
tries could rely more on generic international standards. For example, if
there was a serious problem with data disclosure, or with banking supervi-
sion, or with corporate governance, the crisis country could agree to meet
international standards in these areas by date x. A potential appeal of the
standards is that they represent the consensus on good practice in that area
by a group of international experts—not the views of an individual mission
chief or even of the Fund (see Eichengreen 2000). Since the fund is already
engaged (on a voluntary basis) in evaluating countries’ compliance with
standards and codes, this approach might also aﬀord more ﬂexibility in the
time frame for meeting these conditions.
The disadvantage of the standards approach is that the standards them-
selves may not be speciﬁc enough to address the pressing problems at hand.
If the elements of the standards are too vague, monitoring would likely lead
to frequent disagreements.
Leaner Structural Conditionality within Present Arrangements
Under this approach, the Fund’s executive board would issue a new guid-
ance note calling for “leaner” structural conditionality; henceforth, each
structural condition included in a program would have to be directly related
to ﬁnancial stability and would have to carry a macroeconomic impact; in
addition, the note might increase the use of formal performance criteria rel-
ative to more discretionary structural benchmarks and program reviews.
The aim of this new guidance note would be not only to induce mission
chiefs to be less wide-ranging and detailed in their structural policy recom-
mendations but also to dissuade both creditor and debtor governments
from pushing for structural conditions that did not fall within the Fund’s
core competence (“I’d like to help you, Mr. Deputy Minister, but that just
isn’t our job”). Associated with this leaner structural conditionality might
also be an eﬀort to increase the Fund’s leverage for structural policy reform
in nonprogram channels. For example, structural weaknesses could be
given more attention in published Fund Article IV reports, leaving it more
to the private markets to apply pressure for reform. Additionally, much of
what now appears as detailed structural benchmarks (in a Fund program)
on how to implement a given structural reform could be handled in Fund
technical assistance.
Skeptics might argue that the existing guidance note on conditionality
that has been around for twenty years or more is perfectly adequate. Why
would a new one make much of a diﬀerence? To make a diﬀerence, man-
agement and the Fund’s executive board would have to be much more com-
mitted to enforcing the new note than they were in enforcing the previous
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derstanding with the G7 and with emerging economies that greater re-
straint would be exercised than heretofore in assigning the fund new tasks.
For example, just within the few months previous to the time of this writ-
ing, the G7 requested the IMF to step up its monitoring of money launder-
ing. Questions would also arise on how many structural conditions and how
much detail would be appropriate for such a leaner structural conditional-
ity (that is, would it be a big change from prevailing practice, or only a small
modiﬁcation?).
Allowing the Fund to Borrow in the Private Capital Markets
If some G7 legislatures use the Fund’s requests for funding (increases in
quota, funding for new facilities and debt initiatives, etc.) as points of lever-
age to impose a variety of (counterproductive and superﬂuous) conditions
on Fund lending practices, it might be argued that the Fund should be given
authority to borrow in the private capital markets (thereby increasing its in-
dependence).53 Those who oppose this proposal would contend that the
Fund itself, not G7 legislatures, is the main source of excessive structural
conditionality; thus, easier funding would reduce “accountability” to the
Fund’s shareholders and might just as well increase the scope of Fund con-
ditionality as reduce it.
Clearer Division of Responsibility with the World Bank and 
More Outsourcing of Structural Conditionality in Noncore Areas
The aim here is to retain the advantages of a “comprehensive” approach
to crisis prevention and management, sustainable growth, and poverty re-
duction, while improving the eﬀectiveness of (total) structural policy con-
ditionality by paying greater attention to the diﬀerent comparative advan-
tages of the various IFIs. Even if the number of structural conditions in
Fund programs remained unchanged, the Fund would design and monitor
only those conditions that fit within its defined “core competence” (say,
monetary, ﬁscal, exchange rate, and ﬁnancial-sector policies); anything else
would be the responsibility of the World Bank or other IFIs. If one of the
other IFIs was not moving fast enough in drafting a structural policy re-
quirement, the Fund would not be permitted to take over. It would have to
stay in its own yard. Under some proposals, the Fund would transfer pri-
mary responsibility for running the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facil-
ity (PRGF) to the World Bank, although the Fund would still have a sign-
oﬀ on the adequacy of macroeconomic policies in such programs with
low-income countries. Under other proposals (see Kohler and Wolfensohn
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53. Another proposal for reducing political demands on the Fund is go to “independent”
executive directors—much in the manner of national central banks; see De Gregorio et al.
(1999).2000), the World Bank would get its own new lending window (the Poverty
Reduction Support Credit [PRSC]) to support poverty reduction in low-
income countries, and the Fund would continue to run and fund the PGRF.
Renewed eﬀorts would also be made to improve Fund-World Bank coop-
eration.
Here, too, there are many potential objections and questions. If the prob-
lem is too much and too detailed structural policy conditionality as a whole,
why would rearranging responsibilities among the IFIs solve it? If the
PGRF is about poverty reduction and if that is supposed to be the main
focus of the World Bank, why does the Fund run that facility? If it’s true, as
suggested by the U.S. Treasury (2000a), that unless the Fund’s board has its
own money at stake, Fund evaluation of macroeconomic policies in pro-
grams with low-income countries won’t be done seriously (even with a for-
mal sign-oﬀ in programs run by the World Bank), why should we expect
other IFIs to be diligent in their evaluation of structural policies in Fund-
led programs? Why do we need two lending facilities (the existing PGRF
in the Fund, and the new PRSC in the World Bank) to support poverty
reduction and macroeconomic stability in the low-income countries?
Wouldn’t one make more sense? How will the IMF and World Bank co-
operate more closely with other international organizations (e.g., the Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements, the World Trade Organization, the ILO, etc.) under
the “contracting-out model” and still meet the demanding time require-
ments of crisis resolution?
5.1.6 Concluding Remarks
I agree with Stanley Fischer’s (2000a, 2) assessment that “the IMF....
promotes good macroeconomic and financial-sector policies among its
members.” However, my reading of the record is that on structural policies
the Fund has bitten oﬀ more—in both scope and detail—than either it or
its member countries can chew. There are limits—no matter how numerous
and detailed the Fund’s monitoring techniques—to how far the Fund can
push a country to undertake structural reforms that it itself is not strongly
committed to. Consistent with this view, compliance with fund condition-
ality has been a serious and growing problem. International Monetary
Fund mission chiefs have considerable knowledge and experience in macro-
economic and ﬁnancial policies but not in structural policy areas beyond
this core competence. Eﬀorts to include in Fund conditionality everything
but the kitchen sink under the loosely deﬁned agenda of pursuing “high-
quality” growth have taken the Fund too far from its comparative advan-
tage and have elicited legitimate charges of mission creep.
Among the alternative crisis management guidelines discussed in section
5.1.2, the one (Mandate II) that would have the Fund focus on macroeco-
430 Morris Goldsteinnomic and ﬁnancial stability and assist a country not only to get out of its
current crisis but also to minimize the chances of getting into another one
makes the most sense to me. Conditions that lie outside the core areas of
monetary, ﬁscal, exchange rate, and ﬁnancial-sector policies should be sig-
nificantly fewer in Fund programs than the average of the past five years
and should require strong justiﬁcation in any program, including having a
macroeconomic impact (as called for in the original conditionality guide-
lines for standby programs). I also read the record as suggesting that the
eﬀectiveness of Fund structural conditionality would be increased if a small
number of structural performance criteria was substituted for the vast ar-
ray of structural benchmarks that have characterized many past Fund pro-
grams. This would require IMF staﬀto think harder about which structural
conditions merited the highest priority in the reform eﬀort, and about
which structural policy changes needed to be made now (during the crisis)
and which could wait until somewhat later; putting more weight on a few
structural performance criteria would also send a clearer signal to the bor-
rower that failure to meet those performance criteria would likely result in
a halt in Fund disbursements.
Last but not least, streamlining and improving Fund structural policy
conditionality is about Fund management saying “no” more often than in
the past—to requests for Fund assistance where the expectation is low that
the country will actually implement Fund policy conditions, to G7 govern-
ments when they propose new tasks for the Fund that go beyond the Fund’s
core competence, to NGOs that seek to use a country’s Letter of Intent with
the Fund to advance agendas (even if desirable) that lie outside the Fund’s
mandate and comparative advantage, and to developing-country finance
ministries that want to use micro conditions in Fund programs to impose
spending discipline on other government ministries that could not be ob-
tained via their national legislatures.
Mr. Kohler’s intention to end mission creep at the Fund and to streamline
the Fund’s structural policy conditionality is welcome. However, it remains
to be seen how he will pursue that objective and what the eﬀects will be.
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2. Timothy F. Geithner
Structural Conditionality in IMF Programs
This is a good time for a broad reassessment of the appropriate scope of In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality.
The new conventional wisdom, fathered in part by Martin Feldstein, the
thrust of which is that the fund has strayed far beyond its classic mandate
to the point that it is gratuitously intrusive in a ridiculously expansive array
of micro-level structural issues, is debilitating in its impact on the Fund’s
credibility. When the popular perceptions of the world’s preeminent mone-
tary institution are so dominated by small anecdotes of contestable judge-
ments about cashews, sugar, cotton, or cloves, then you have a real problem,
IMF Structural Programs 437even if the judgments made were in fact fundamentally sensible. It is not a
good sign when the debate about the Fund is framed by criticisms that echo
the critique of U.S. diplomacy as foreign policy as social work or misguided
nation building.
So this is a necessary debate, and, like the recent debate about facilities
reform and pricing, it’s a good way to reevaluate the basic mission of the in-
stitution.
Figuring out what to do about this potential problem of overreach is not
easy, however. It is complicated by a few basic features of the present real-
ity.
There is the basic reality that world has come over time to adopt a rather
expansive deﬁnition of the range of policies and institutions that are im-
portant to economic success, to durable development, to reducing vulnera-
bility to crises. The analytical judgments that led the Fund to conclude
some time ago that there was a set of structural policies beyond the classic
core of the monetary policy framework, the fiscal constraint, and the ex-
change rate regime that were in many cases necessary for successful pro-
grams remain valid today.
There is the basic reality that a cooperative institution structured like the
Fund does not really have the luxury of not lending to its members, pro-
vided they are willing to promise to commit to some conditions. Moreover,
in an institution of 182 members, many of which are what you might call
weak states, governance challenged, and the like, a basic level of prudence
or ﬁduciary responsibility will necessarily require broad, and sometimes in-
trusive, safeguards on how the resources of the Fund are used.
There is the basic reality that it will be untenable for the Fund to put sub-
stantial resources at risk in any country without seeking to address the
problems that materially contributed to the crisis and without trying to re-
duce the sources of vulnerability to future crisis. If the Fund is denied this
capacity, then you won’t have a Fund with a meaningful capacity to inter-
vene in crises.
There is the basic reality that the Fund does not have the capacity to ap-
ply meaningful conditionality ex ante, and thus much of the burden for im-
portant reforms falls on program conditionality ex post.
Finally, there is the basic political reality, most conspicuous in the United
States, and fueled in part by the globalization anxiety, that has tended to
support a progressively more expansive view of what the Fund should seek
to achieve in terms of social equity, much less economic eﬃciency, using the
leverage of its programs.
There is a fundamental danger in the new conventional critique of the
Fund that its adherents shelter a diverse mix of motivations.
Some of the proponents of a return to some set of narrow, core, simple,
old virtues of macroeconomic probity are moved primarily by opposition
438 Timothy F. Geithnerto or discomfort with the notion of conditionality itself. A simple require-
ment for collateral seems an appealing alternative to many.
Some of the critics are in the “ownership camp,” which in its more ex-
treme form has the strange circular logic that eﬀective conditionality is pos-
sible only where it is fully owned, and where it is fully owned it is essentially
unnecessary, and it is pushing the international ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs)
generally in directions that may produce simply less conditionality or
weaker conditionality.
Some of the proponents of streamlining are moved by one critique of the
Fund’s prescriptions in Asia, a critique based on a not totally implausible
view that the crisis was a liquidity crisis suﬀered by fundamentally quite
healthy economies and that therefore recovery should not have required sig-
nificant policy change. The truth, however, is that fundamentally healthy
countries are not really vulnerable to sustained panics or runs that threaten
a deeper crisis. Moreover, the countries in Asia each had a set of funda-
mental weaknesses that left them vulnerable to shifts in sentiment, and ad-
dressing those weaknesses was plausibly considered critical to a restoration
of conﬁdence and more durable recovery.
Some of the proponents of streamlining see a compelling virtue in sim-
plicity for simplicity’s sake, with the somewhat naive hope that the Fund
can stay out of complex choices that are inescapable in dealing, for example,
with a systemically insolvent ﬁnancial system, where the government owns
not just the banking system but much of the corporate assets of the coun-
try, and where there is no functioning legal system or other safeguards to
prevent looting, or with a ﬁscal problem in a poor country where scarce re-
sources are drained by state enterprises or subsidies for the urban class, or
with an adjustment challenge in a country with a currency board where the
structure of the labor market does not allow wages to adjust.
These motivations are not, I think, good reasons to favor streamlining,
and they are not a good guide for how to refocus the Fund. To indulge them
is in some respects dangerous, if you care about preserving the capacity of
the fund to be engaged in creating a world less vulnerable to ﬁnancial crisis,
in promoting more durable transition in emerging market economies to
capital-market access, and in addressing the development challenges in the
poorest countries.
What is the right standard for determining what the Fund should and
should not promote in its programs? There are three such approaches that
I do not think make sense. The core/noncore distinction doesn’t answer the
question of what should be core. The critical/noncritical distinction doesn’t
help deﬁne what should be critical. The less-is-more minimalism doesn’t de-
ﬁne what minimalist core would actually be more eﬀective than the broader
alternatives.
The challenge is to deﬁne an aﬃrmative standard for deciding what is im-
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tinuum, with the classic core macroeconomic framework at one extreme,
with the ﬁnancial system next, then other conditions necessary to restore
conﬁdence and capital market access and reduce the risk of future crisis,
then governance issues, and then at the other end of the continuum a
broader set of policies that are desirable from the standpoint of economic
eﬃciency and social equity.
On this continuum, I think the right place for the Fund to start in the cri-
sis context is in that middle area, with the presumption that, in addition to
the macroeconomic policy framework and the ﬁnancial system, you have to
try to address credibly those other factors that are critical to restoring con-
ﬁdence and growth, to restoring capital-market access as soon as possible,
and to reducing the risk of a future crisis. Moreover, it should be symmetri-
cally hard to move too far in either direction on that continuum, either to
the fundamentally more narrow extreme or to the more expansive realm of
the simply desirable improvements in economic eﬃciency.
Under this standard, it would be appropriate to seek in the program to
address, where they are material, fundamental problems in the insolvency
regime, protections for minority shareholders, restrictions on capital in-
ﬂows, and distortions in the capital account regime, the deposit insurance
system, the social safety net, the legal regime governing privatization and
asset disposal, conspicuous corruption problems.
This test, however, is still quite broad, and probably still too vulnerable to
expansive interpretation. In order for it to work, it has to be supplemented
by a set of other tests or ﬁlters to ensure a more selective approach.
• Forcing fewer conditions will help, because that will force prioritiza-
tion, and sensible constraints on the quantity of measures can be eﬀec-
tive discipline.
• There needs to be some credible test of scale and materiality in terms of
economic impact.
• The Fund has to be prepared to forswear advocacy of the simply desir-
able, where it is not essential, or where the community of experts might
disagree on the superiority of the proposed prescription.
• The Fund should be careful to agree to incorporate as a condition of
the program policy requirements that do not meet the test of material
or essentiality, simply because the reformers in the government want
some leverage in promoting part of their broader agenda.
• It will be appropriate for the Fund to defer to the preferences of the
government, if it has a record of credibility and competence and is
democratically elected.
• Establishing a greater presumption against extensive structural bench-
marks, and a presumption in favor of making core structural condi-
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ing what is really necessary to justify disbursement and worth sus-
pending the program over if there is a failure to comply.
To support some evolution toward streamlining, I think there needs to be a
complementary evolution towards a broader list of generalized conditions
for access to IMF resources.
There is no reason why all IMF members should not be required to meet
minimum standards for disclosure and for transparency of the ﬁscal ac-
counts and monetary policy operation, to apply minimum safeguards such
as the new requirement that central banks undertake annually and publish
an external audit, and perhaps to meet some minimum standards relevant
to the vulnerability of the ﬁnancial system.
Adopting these as universal conditions will reduce the need for uncom-
fortably extensive lists of individualized conditions in speciﬁc programs.
Shifting the burden of conditionality to disciplines that can be applied ex
ante reduces the need for the ex post application of those conditions in pro-
gram design.
In an institution where membership brings with it access to potentially
large amounts of resources, it makes sense to have a greater set of ex ante
constraints on potentially risky behavior. The Article IV process will never
have suﬃcient traction to achieve this.
The corollary of this point is that we have to give the Fund the will to say
“no” more often, to refuse to lend, or to suspend disbursements, in condi-
tions that are untenable or in which justifying a program requires an exces-
sive level of protections and therefore conditions.
It is hard to make this credible, in part because there will be cases in which
the Fund will have no choice given the risk of broader economic damage to
other economies. Also, it requires a greater willingness by the preferred
creditors to accept the accumulation of arrears in situations in which the
country at issue has large and immediate obligations to the IFIs that they
may not have the resources available to meet.
Despite these diﬃculties, it is worth raising the bar for IMF engagement
in conditions in which the level of corruption is truly systemic, the state is
too weak to make credible commitments to deliver on the program condi-
tions, governance problems are fundamental, the government is among the
most extreme oﬀenders on the money laundering or ﬁnancial crime scale,
and the government cannot make credible commitments in the program to
address these problems.
A necessary condition for any meaningful withdrawal for the Fund from
important structural conditions is a greater demonstrated capacity by the
World Bank to design and apply meaningful conditionality for its program
lending. This condition does not now exist. It may be in prospect, but the
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tionality, particularly on the middle-income countries, are formidable.
This is important, because part of the cause of the perceived expansion
in the scope of IMF imposed structural conditions is a pragmatic conspir-
acy between World Bank and IMF staﬀ and the reformers in borrowing
governments to build conditions into Fund programs because of the ab-
sence of an eﬀective vehicle in the World Bank for applying that condition-
ality with force.
It is important in this exploration of ways to streamline conditionality
that we not lose sight of the probably more important substantive challenge
of ﬁguring out how to improve the design of policies and the content of
whatever conditionality we decide is essential. The lack of consensus in the
economic profession about the appropriate macro policy response to a con-
fidence crisis in an economy with a healthy fiscal position but a terribly
weak banking sector is fundamentally troubling. The extent of debate
within the Fund, between the Fund and the World Bank, and among the ex-
perts in the supervisory community about the appropriate degree of for-
bearance and about strategies for intervention, recapitalization, resolution,
and asset disposal in banking systems undergoing systemic failure is highly
problematic and caused very damaging delays in the recent cases.
These problems of the substance of the economic strategy are in some
ways more material and more important to try to resolve than the perceived
imperative to simply streamline.
Moreover, any credible support by the United States for progress on this
front will require an eﬀort by the next administration to buy some room for
maneuvering from Congress. The erosion of the traditional internationalist
center in the U.S. political spectrum has left us more vulnerable to the de-
mands of a coalition on the right and left, the price of whose support has
been an escalating set of demands, on the one hand for market-oriented re-
forms and liberalization and on the other hand for social equity and core
labor standards. The consensus shared by Congressman Barney Frank and
Senator Phil Gramm requires us to advocate a particularly broad deﬁnition
of desirable or core conditionality. It’s possible they may each be more will-
ing to cede ground in favor of a more narrow mandate overall.
Finally, I think it is important to ask ourselves whether the errors of the
past have fundamentally been errors of excessive ambition for policy
change or excessive indulgence of poor performance. The world is still a bit
confused and divided on this point. Has the Fund been too tough or too ac-
commodating? Or, as some have suggested, has it been both, by setting un-
realistic aspirations for policy reform and then acquiescing to the inevitable
failure of even relatively well intentioned governments to meet the bar?
There is something to this. The right approach is some mix of greater real-
ism in the initial level of conditionality established and greater force and
will in holding governments to that more realistic standard.
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Morris Goldstein’s paper is of such good quality that it is important to ex-
amine it, especially given his position as a former insider, somebody who is
able to stand oﬀ and look at the International Monetary Fund. As you
would expect from someone of Goldstein’s experience, the paper is bal-
anced, insightful, and knowledgeable. It is practically oriented, and above
all else, it’s important. This is the view of somebody who does know the
Fund and has the objectivity of looking at it under stress.
From my point of view the great problem, apart from what the structural
conditionality and the size of the program did to the Suharto regime and to
other regimes during the crisis, was ﬁrst and foremost the distractions these
programs presented to the task at hand. In his paper, Goldstein distin-
guishes crisis management from crisis prevention, suggesting that crisis
management should be the guide to the program. He says, “It doesn’t pre-
clude giving some consideration to other objectives, but it makes clear
which objective is king, and where the authorities’ central responsibility
lies. The emphasis on getting out of the current crisis would mean that cri-
sis management and resolution and not crisis prevention should guide
program design. Crisis prevention measures would then presumably be
handled by countries on their own, after the crisis is resolved.”
He is attempting to address the Washington consensus on ﬁnancial and
structural improvement, which every ﬁnance minister and every ﬁnance
ministry oﬃcial worth his salt knows about: decent structural reform. How-
ever, what is the relevance of structural reforms of this nature in a crisis of
this kind? Goldstein says, “The number of structural policy conditions in-
cluded in these programs with the three Asian crisis economies was very
large, if not totally unprecedented, many more than you can count using all
your ﬁngers and toes. At their peak there were 140 in Indonesia, over 90 in
Korea, and over 70 in Thailand.” Then he ampliﬁes in table 5.5 a point I
made yesterday, that in October 1997, when the crisis was really starting to
boil, there were 28 structural policy conditions in Indonesia. By January
1998 there were 31, and by April 1998 there were 140. Even though In-
donesia was in great trouble through this period, as the rupiah really started
to collapse and as political strife started to set in, the conditionality went up.
In other words, not only could the athlete not get over the bar at a certain
height, but the bar, instead of being lowered to give him a chance to clear it,
was actually raised. The tables make this point graphically. Goldstein,
thanks to Stanley Fischer, who has given him access to the IMF, has listed
the remedial programs, things like reducing tariﬀs on nonfood agricultural
products by 5 percent and gradually reducing tariﬀs on nonagricultural
products to a maximum of 10 percentage points. Well, these are all the
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1980s. We know how hard they are to do. They are important. But in a cri-
sis like this, reducing tariﬀs by 5 percent on chemical products? Abolishing
import restrictions on new and used ships? Phasing out remaining quanti-
tative importing restrictions on other nontariﬀ barriers? The list goes on.
“Remove restrictions on foreign investments in palm oil plantations.” “Re-
lease farmers from forced planting of sugar cane.” It was these things and
the breadth of the demands that, I believe, forced Suharto to give up and
appoint his own cabinet, which included his own daughter and a number of
the cronies. Of course, when that happened he put the wagons in a circle and
decided to carry on independently. I do not mock these reforms—they are
important in their own way—but I go back to Goldstein’s point. The im-
perative issue was crisis management, not crisis prevention. These are crisis
prevention issues: in fact, they are not even that. They’re simply reforms
that make an economy more open, more supple, and more productive.
They’re matters to attend to over time, that take time, that require dealing
with the special interest groups. It takes a long time to achieve these things.
In Australia’s case, it took ﬁfteen years to do these sorts of things. To de-
mand these reforms instantaneously, in a crisis, is naive at best and wilful at
worst.
Goldstein, in a very important note, says, “similarly, to show that crony-
ism and corruption would henceforth be less prevalent, it is important at
least in Indonesia to take a few visible privileges and sweetheart deals away
from those close to President Suharto.” Well, the problem, for instance,
with the bank closures in 1997, when the fund shut in one of the banks that
belonged to Suharto’s son, wasn’t that the bank belonged to his son; it was
the signal it sent to the Chinese community. You have to remember that all
of the racial strife in Indonesia against the Chinese did not generate from
the bottom; it always began at the top. The Chinese saw Suharto as their
protector against detractors in the top ranks. He saw the Chinese as the
people who could develop the economy. So essentially he was the one upon
whom they relied. When they saw the Fund shutting in the son’s bank, they
said, “the old man is finished. The thirty years he’s given us have ended.”
That is when the ﬂight of Chinese capital began in earnest.
In the 1980s I nursed two banks in Australia with assets of 150 to 200 bil-
lion, as indeed did Paul Volcker during his time as governor of the Federal
Reserve with banks in this country. Frankly, if we had cold-turkeyed them,
they would have collapsed. There are in Australia lender-of-last-resort fa-
cilities, but in the end that is underwritten by the national budget. If you are
worried about moral hazard, you’d have some real worries if you inculcate
in a generation of bankers that they can be bailed out. So you nurse them
through. I believe that shutting banks, for instance, in a crisis like this, was
naive at least, and ill-advised—amateur hour stuﬀ.
Goldstein makes many important points. He says that, for the most part,
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sion’s consensus on what constitutes sensible structural reform. Well, that’s
true. Although some serious mistakes in the sequencing of reforms have
taken place, Goldstein goes on to say the core of the Fund’s programs were
appropriate, with the exception of the bad compromise made on bank clo-
sures in Indonesia. However, he says, “the Fund’s structural conditionality
in the Asian crisis and especially in Indonesia appears excessive both in
scope and in detail.” He goes on, “there were elements of the structural con-
ditionality of the three Fund programs with Indonesia, Korea, and Thai-
land that seemed superfluous.” He says, “I don’t find persuasive the argu-
ment that trade liberalization measures in the Indonesian and Korean
programs were necessary to prevent a slide toward protectionism.” Let me
underline that. The Bogor Declaration, which was the most ambitious trade
declaration of any kind and which was in the course of being adopted at the
end of 1992 and during 1993, at the Asia Pacific Economic Corporation
(APEC) meeting in Indonesia, brought the Uruguay Round to a close.
The Uruguay Round had been going for seven years. We’d had the Euro-
peans ﬁghting on agriculture for seven years against the Cairns group and
other agricultural producers. It was only when it became obvious that the
Asians and the United States could organize themselves into a trade group-
ing of some kind that the ﬁnal impetus to getting the round signed came. At
the 1993 meeting of APEC, where the Bogor Declaration was adopted, it
was Suharto that championed it as the chair of the meeting. And right
through the period, for any observer of Indonesia, his government was pro-
gressively deregulating. That cabinet of his was progressively deregulating
the Indonesian economy. So the notion that they were going to slide back
into protectionism was, of course, a self-serving notion by those designing
the program. Moreover, if we look at the postcrisis situation, fortunately,
with the exception of Malaysia, all of Asia has gone on to be open. So in
other words, the inculcation of free-trade values has actually stuck, despite
what’s happened. Goldstein did not ﬁnd persuasive the argument that we
needed these things because of the likelihood of a slide toward protection-
ism. This conclusion is, I believe, correct.
I do not see why the Indonesian program needed to be so sweeping with
respect to the dismantling of state monopolies and cartels, the elimination
of restrictive marketing agreements, the abolition of showcase projects, and
the like, disagreeable as some of these practices were. The car projects were
Neanderthal. There is 50 percent more investment in car plants in Asia than
the market can use. Again, however, this was trying to be done in the con-
text of a crisis. For conﬁdence reasons, a few candies may have had to be
taken from cronies, Goldstein says, but the rest of the box, and admittedly
it was a very big box, could have waited until later. He says, moving from the
width to the depth of conditionality, the level of detail reﬂected in the struc-
tural benchmarks for these programs likewise seems excessive. For example,
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policy? And eighteen conditions for follow-up actions to the ﬁndings of the
Bank of Indonesia? Or in Korea, was it essential to have eleven conditions
for investment guidelines and for corporate governance of insurance com-
panies? He moves along in that vein.
I think this is the point of the triage list. Someone arrives at a hospital
who’s had an accident. He has a broken collarbone, a fractured ankle, and
a punctured lung. What he doesn’t need is a lecture about the evils of smok-
ing. What he needs is a suture on the bleeding within the lung. Do that ﬁrst.
Then worry about the collarbone, and then the ankle. This is why these
structural programs were so destructive to the task at hand.
Goldstein goes on to say—somewhat tongue in cheek, but let me quote
him—“ﬁnally there have been occasions, the Korean and Indonesian pro-
grams are important cases in point, when strong pressure from particular
G7 countries during the program negotiations resulted in the inclusion of
speciﬁc structural policies in the Fund program, and this, despite the pro-
visions of the Fund’s charter, Article 12, Section 4, for each member coun-
try of the Fund, ‘to refrain from all attempts to inﬂuence any of the Fund
staﬀ in the discharge of their functions.’” Now, from someone so knowl-
edgeable, this is a pretty tough paragraph. What it’s saying is that there was
too much pressure applied to Fund staﬀ for additions to conditionality.
Now I know Timothy F. Geithner made the point, perhaps validly, that
people within Indonesia wanted to use the Fund as a battering ram to put
structural conditions into the program, conditions that they thought they’d
never get from the government, and the Fund says, “Oh yes, well, we’ll put
them in.” Well, if you expect nothing of the Fund, you expect it to be wise.
When you see people coming, pulling dirty postcards from their sleeves, for
structural programs that they cannot secure through their own ministries,
you should be wary. But not the U.S. Treasury or the Fund. The fact is, no-
body is that naive. This was all happening for a reason.
I do believe, and this is where I disagree with a lot of people, I said yes-
terday, that at the end of the Cold War, Indonesia’s importance faded. There
was a view, particularly in the United States, that Suharto was too big a load
to carry: okay in the Cold War, not okay now. This came particularly after
Bishop Belo and Ramos Horta were given the Nobel Peace Prize. That
Bishop Belo should have been given the prize was ﬁne, but someone who
had been an active guerilla on the part of Fretilin, the Timor branch of the
Portuguese Communist Party, was of course one up the nose of every other
person in Timor and the Indonesian government. From that moment on,
Indonesia was in trouble, and somewhere along the way people said, it’s
time they were gone. The key point about Indonesia was that Suharto was
already old, so the real issue was about the kind of country there would be
after he left.
At any rate, we’ve been over these issues, and I don’t see much product in
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lates the view that mission creep was on here in big doses. At its best, it was
distracting, and at its worst, wilful, political, and damaging. As a result, the
advised, which happened to be the member governments in the case of In-
donesia, turned away from the advisor (the Fund) and decided to run their
own policy, and that was of course the end. People may say that we’ve got
an independent democratic structure from it. Well, we have a democratic
structure, but whether it has appropriate economic and political authority
is still a moot point. However, the cost to Indonesia and its population has
been profound. The old families are still there, and frankly they much pre-
fer to deal with the provincial governors than the central government, so
this is not going to reduce corruption, I don’t believe. I mean, out in the
provinces, to where the power has now shifted, we’re going to see more of
this. We have not yet seen the kind of changes we looked for: we’re not see-
ing assets freed up; we’re seeing very crude debt-for-equity swaps. The old
families are often still in charge, and instead of the debt, they hand banks a
bag of equity, making them a minority equity holder in a business that is still
controlled by the family.
None of this is changing much. The army, which has always been an in-
tegral part of Indonesia, is no longer in a position of unchallenged primacy.
It’s still there as an integral part, but it’s no longer a decisive part of politics.
It’s now standing away from it, and it will again have to be dealt with by
whoever’s running the civilian authority. The problem with all of this is that
if you live in Washington, Indonesia’s a long way oﬀ. However, in our part
of the world—Malaysia, Australia—we live with this. Indonesia is the epi-
center of southeast Asia, and the importance of this conference is to get fo-
cused on some of these matters.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 3 Summit,
which is essentially the proposal that Prime Minister Mahartir had for the
East Asia economic caucus, has now happened, and you have got ASEAN
plus Korea plus Japan plus China looking at Asian solutions to problems.
Australia is not there, and the United States is not there. The Chiang Mai
initiative, the proposed swaps arrangement, and talk of some sort of Asian
monetary fund are happening outside the U.S./IMF orbit.
Let me get a few other prejudices in the marketplace. I believe that if the
IMF didn’t exist, we’d have to invent it. So I’m not about seeing the IMF
deteriorate. I attended my ﬁrst Interim Committee meeting in 1983, and I
attended it for ten years, so I know the Fund reasonably well. I think it’s an
important institution in this world. However, I don’t think we should be
unduly worried about other people doing other things. In other words, I
think we should keep an open mind about whether there should or can be
an Asian monetary facility. I think somebody made the point yesterday
about the very high national reserves that countries are now accruing to
protect themselves. The notion will occur to them, at some point, they
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Asian monetary facility. The U.S. worry is that it would be dominated by
Japan. If it were dominated by Japan, you wouldn’t see the crassness we saw
displayed in the conditionality programs in Indonesia. Whatever failings
the Japanese have for negotiating from under the table and so on, the fact of
the matter is that it would have a softer, more, if you like, Asian complex-
ion, than anything that is operated by North Americans or Europeans. I’m
not automatically for an Asian monetary fund, but I’m not for ruling it out.
I don’t think we ought to panic about the fact that people are talking about
these things. If we have support facilities, which ease these crises, without
adding to the moral hazard problem of making it easier for banks to with-
draw, picking up Mervyn King’s point from yesterday, about orderly versus
disorderly exits, and about standstill and so on, it might be that the IMF
doesn’t have to carry the full load.
At any rate, the IMF’s not getting the funding it needs. The United States
has been employing a dog-in-the-manger policy here for years. The long run
of all this may be that the Asian crisis brought on some rethinking about
where we should go with a modern ﬁnancial system and how we might deal
with crises of this kind, crises that are probably going to occur in the future.
A review of this, under Feldstein’s leadership at the National Bureau of
Economic Research, is, I think, terribly apposite—in fact, high time. The
paper written by Morris Goldstein is a brave piece of work, one that is in-
structive to the rest of us who do not often have that inside knowledge but
who worry about the future of countries that strategically are not always the
center of attention.
4. Yung Chul Park
I have never spoken to an audience as distinguished as this one, so I have
had some slight diﬃculties preparing this presentation. Instead of com-
menting on Morris Goldstein’s paper, which is extremely well written and a
good paper, I am going to talk about Korea’s structural reform and re-
structuring of the ﬁnancial institutions and corporations since the ﬁnancial
crisis in 1997. During my presentation I will use the terms “we” and “Ko-
rea” interchangeably.
I will make a start by talking about recent developments in Korea. As you
have already noticed, the economy is slowing down considerably. At pres-
ent people, including politicians, believe that Korea is still in a crisis, or, if
not in a crisis, heading toward another crisis. Well, this perception is rather
surprising. Since the ﬁnancial crisis in 1997, Korea has increased foreign re-
serve by more than $90 billion, which is nearly 20 percent of Korea’s gross
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expected to grow more than 8 percent in 2000. The latest forecast, adjusted
for the inﬂation, suggests that the economy will grow by 4–5 percent in
2001. Korea has spent more than $100 billion for restructuring ﬁnancial in-
stitutions and corporations. Recently the government has appropriated an-
other $50 billion to close down the insolvent ﬁnancial institutions, not nec-
essarily banks, but also to restructure corporate debt. Yet many people,
especially the market participants—both domestic and foreign—believe
that basically the major causes of the current looming crisis are due to the
lack of progress in corporate and ﬁnancial restructuring. The complacency
among the policymakers who are responsible for the economic reform is an-
other reason.
Now, it is time to think about what International Monetary Fund (IMF)
structural policy has meant to a country like Korea. In my view, IMF struc-
tural policy had at least three or four fundamental problems.
The ﬁrst problem was that the purpose and objectives of structural pol-
icy were not very clear from the beginning. In the case of Korea, the struc-
tural policy consisted of two elements. At the early stage of the crisis, the
structural policy was to stabilize foreign exchange markets, domestic ﬁnan-
cial markets, and the payment systems. Stabilizing these markets required
closing down a number of ﬁnancial institutions and liquidating a large num-
ber of insolvent corporations. The second element of the structural policy
was an institutional reform, covering the corporations, ﬁnancial sector,
public sector, and the labor market. Also, there was pressure on the further
opening of the trade and ﬁnancial regimes. However, what were the objec-
tives of these policies? The objective of reform is basically to improve the
eﬃciency of the country in the long run. For the reform to be successful, in-
stitutional reform must have very clear objectives in terms of time frame. As
far as IMF structural policy is concerned, it is really hard to say that objec-
tives were well deﬁned, because many Koreans and market participants
thought the structural policy was just designed to get the Korean economy
out of the crisis. However, I strongly suspect that was the major objective.
The second problem was that the structural policy did not clearly state
the targets of these policies and indicators. If the IMF could have identiﬁed
it more clearly, it would have been much easier to carry out structural poli-
cies. For instance, as far as the corporate restructuring was concerned, we
did not have a clear idea of the desired goal of corporate restructuring. For
example, the debt-equity ratio: “Should the target be 200 percent? Or lower
than that? If the 200 percent debt-equity ratio is the target, then why should
it be the target?” There were not clear answers for these questions at that
time. If we have to close down many insolvent ﬁnancial institutions, then
who will be responsible for the role performed by these major ﬁnancial in-
stitutions to disappear? The other problem was that there were no indica-
tors suggesting whether the structural policies were carried out according
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people interested in the structural reform process whether Korea was going
in the right direction or not. In fact, Korea had diﬃculties in checking its
performance because of unclear targets and the failure to provide appro-
priate indicators on structural reforms. Markets could not give clear an-
swers to whether Korea’s reform and restructuring were going in the right
direction, either. At the same time, the markets were not very interested in
understanding the thrust of the structural policies and the progress in Ko-
rea as a result of structural reforms.
When the economy is doing well with high growth, nobody raises struc-
tural problems. However, when the economy is stuck in a recession, as Ko-
rea is now, then people start doubting the economy. From my point of view,
at the moment the problems are mainly caused by the adverse external de-
velopments: that is, the worsening of the terms of trade and the recession in
Korea’s major trading countries. Nevertheless, it is still believed that the
structural problems are the major causes of the current economic recession
and another possible crisis in the near future. I strongly disagree with this
thought. If Korea is to step up with the reform and restructuring, then it
would not be the right time. After two years of restructuring, labor unions
and the politicians were tired of economic reform. As a result, they are not
willing to spend any additional money on reform and restructuring, al-
though another $50 to $70 billion would be needed to sort unproﬁtable ﬁ-
nancial institutions out.
In a democratic country like Korea, it is not easy to just order labor
unions and politicians to go on with reform and restructuring. Politicians
claim that the government is pushing too far with the reform program
through the National Assembly. There is a heated debate going on about
what further restructuring should be done in the future. In my point of view,
$50 billion will not be enough to sort out a large portion of bad loans from
ﬁnancial institutions or to get rid of heavy corporate debt. The question is
whether we should bail out a large number of ﬁnancial institutions and cor-
porations. Regretfully, in many cases, the structural policies can become a
bailout operation. We should not pay for the cost of cleaning up unprof-
itable ﬁnancial institutions. Instead, we should simply let the shareholders
and the ﬁnancial institutions bear the major burden of this restructuring
cost. However, this will take a while (six months or one year). The market is
unlikely to be patient enough to wait for another six months or a year.
Pushed into a corner, the policymakers will have to bail them out. In other
words, this restructuring is creating very serious moral hazard problems.
Initially after spending $100 billion, the Korean policymakers felt that Ko-
rea was in a position to leave the restructuring process to the market force,
to minimize the moral hazard problem. However, as soon as the market par-
ticipants saw the deterioration in the macroeconomic ﬁgures, they started
putting pressure on the government to do something about the restructur-
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of corporations that should be liquidated or placed under court receiver-
ship. This is what was happening.
Finally, the IMF structural policy was not successful in Korea to mini-
mize the chances of another crisis. Over the two-year period, Korea has in-
troduced all sorts of institutional arrangements designed to deal with the
structural problems. In any economy there are unproﬁtable corporations
that should be liquidated. The market itself must take care of the restruc-
turing process. In order for the market to do it, a large number of institu-
tions has to be improved. For that purpose, we introduced these institu-
tions, and we should give these institutions some tasks. However, Korea
does not seem to have the time to let the institutions take care of these struc-
tural problems. It is always the case that the government is asked to jump
into the process and spend quite a lot of money, and the problem creates
very serious moral hazard problems.
There is one point that I would like to make about Goldstein’s paper. It is
that the article said the structural problems were the main causes of the cri-
sis. I also believe that structural problems were signiﬁcant, and they are still
not negligible. Yet clearly the main causes of the crisis are not structural
problems. These problems obviously deepened and exacerbated the crisis,
but they are unlikely to have been the direct causes. On this question there
are thousands and thousands of publications that Goldstein tends to ignore
entirely. To be precise, he should refer to this growing literature on the pre-
cise causes of the East Asian crisis, particularly in the case of Korea. The
causes are important because the IMF or any other international ﬁnancial
institutions would have to correctly understand causes if they were to de-
sign their structural policy. When Korea was heading toward the ﬁnancial
crisis in 1997, neither the World Bank nor the IMF fully understood the ex-
tent and severity of Korea’s structural problems. We acknowledged these
problems, but we did not imagine they were signiﬁcant to put the whole
economy down. At the same time, the IMF thought the economic funda-
mentals of Korea were strong enough to fend oﬀ the contagion from ﬁnan-
cial turmoil from Southeast Asian countries. Unfortunately, that was not
the case.
Once we understood the causes of the crisis more precisely, it would be
easier to develop more consistently structural policy framework, in terms of
the objectives, targets, and time frame. Nobody believed at the time that
Korea would be able to manage the reform and restructuring over a three-
year period. I still wonder why Korea had to complete the structural reform
within three years. In my point of view Korea ought to continue with the re-
form for another three or ﬁve years, depending on the targets and the ob-
jectives of the structural reform. Well, Korea may have to spend at least
another $50 billion or more, in addition to the $50 billion they have
appropriated for this purpose. We are keen on what could be done to im-
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overcome the crisis and more reforms and restructuring have to be done. In
this respect, I think Goldstein’s paper is a very important contribution, and
I am sure that many other countries, including a country like Korea, will
learn a great deal from his paper. However, once again, it focused too much
on East Asian countries and their structural problems. In my point of view,
his argument is not fair as a generalization.
For the time being, we should give attention to some of the obvious prob-
lems in the international ﬁnancial markets. For example, a large number of
fund managers inﬂuence world capital ﬂows and cross-border ﬁnancial
transactions. When they decide to invest in emerging markets, they are con-
cerned about only three variables: (a) the growth rate as a benchmark for
the rate of return on investment; (b) changes in the foreign reserve level, that
is, current account balance to check the creditworthiness; and (c) other
fund managers behavior to see if they should stay or they should move out
of the country. In this state of aﬀairs, we should pay a little more attention
to problems of international ﬁnancial markets and how the international ﬁ-
nancial system is able to address these problems.
Discussion Summary
Jack Boorman reported on internal IMF work on structural conditional-
ity that adds to the information in Morris Goldstein’s paper. He agreed that
the number of structural conditions in IMF programs has increased sub-
stantially since the late 1980s, a fact that he attributes to the attention given
to growth as an objective of fund-supported programs and to the concen-
tration on transition economies. Although conditionality is most pro-
nounced in programs designed to deal with structural problems, he said
that it has also become more prevalent in standby agreements. He said it is
important to keep in mind that structural conditionality is concentrated in
a few areas, notably the financial sector, fiscal reforms, the trade system,
and other areas in the direct mandate of the Fund. He also cautioned
against judging the extent of conditionality by simply counting the condi-
tions. Often the authorities want guidance on the speciﬁc steps needed to
reach a particular goal. Even so, he admitted that within the Fund there is
broad agreement that the institution went too far in certain cases. The hard
question, however, is if the Fund is to “pull back,” by what criteria it is go-
ing to do so. Boorman said that structural measures needed to be “macro-
relevant”: the ﬁnancial sector is central to macroeconomic performance,
but the performance of the corporate sector is key to the performance of the
ﬁnancial sector. The question is where to stop. He added that if the Fund is
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stitution, such as the World Bank, has to take responsibility.
On the issue of responding to pressure from domestic reformers to put
things into programs that they otherwise would not be able to enact, Boor-
man said that Goldstein wants the Fund to “just say no.” However, he asked
if the Fund should say no to people when they believe the reforms being ad-
vocated move in the right direction. He gave an example of a prime minis-
ter in an Eastern European country that wanted accelerated privatization
as part of a program. Martin Feldstein responded that the prime minister in
a democratic country should be told that if privatization is not central to the
technical problems that the IMF is dealing with, it would not subvert the
democratic process by including it in the program.
Turning to the pressures put on the Fund by its major shareholders, Boor-
man reported that the U.S. Congress has put over forty mandates on the
U.S. executive director in the Fund to go into all kinds of areas. He said that
there should be a better mechanism for deciding “what that staﬀ should be
interested in and what the staﬀ should be pressing.” Here he picked up the
much-commented-upon example of the clove monopoly in Indonesia. This
monopoly diverted income from poor clove producers to those that had
the monopoly on exports. Removing the monopoly led to an immediate in-
crease in the price of cloves to the poor farmers. When Suharto reimposed
the monopoly at the behest of the exporting monopoly, the price went back
down. Taking this as an example of a contentious structural condition, he
asked: “Is this something we should or shouldn’t do? Do we care about
poverty?” When poverty—and governance—can be aﬀected so directly
and substantially by this kind of measure, should that be ignored by the
Fund? He added that similar questions arise when the Fund is dealing with
marketing boards, the prices of other agricultural products, and the like. Fi-
nally, Boorman commented on what he sees as an inconsistency in the crit-
icisms of the Fund from some quarters. He said that some—including the
Meltzer commission—are pushing the Fund to move to “preconditioning,”
and it is doing this to a large extent with its Contingent Credit Line (CCL).
In this, the Fund is told to look at a variety of things, including the sound-
ness of the country’s ﬁnancial system, the relationships it has with its cred-
itors, its adherence to certain standards, and so on. Yet when the country is
in a crisis, the Fund is supposed to restrict itself to a much narrower focus.
Nicholas Stern addressed the evolving division of responsibility between
the World Bank and the IMF. He said that whatever the division of respon-
sibilities, we should be thinking of simplifying and streamlining condition-
ality rather than abandoning it. With so many crises having their source in
structural problems—he gave Russia as an example—it would be negligent
for the Fund to ignore structural issues. However, he added that the Fund
must recognize that it often lacks competence in these areas. On the other
hand, the World Bank has longstanding experience in such areas as rural
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tural reforms.
Turning to concrete steps that have been taken, he pointed to the World
Bank’s new Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC), which is to be used
in conjunction with the Fund’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
(PRGF). The PRSC is more social and institutional, whereas the PRGF is
more macro and ﬁnancial. The idea is that these facilities should move in
parallel. Stern hopes that the new facility will allow the World Bank to over-
come the problem of slow response that has plagued it in the past. Regard-
ing other desirable changes that would make for more eﬃcient response
from the World Bank, Stern said that each country director should have a
two-page description of structural and social conditionalities that would be
required in the event of crisis lending. He added that if the director can’t
produce such a statement, “then it is hard to think of what he or she is ac-
tually doing there.”
Finally, Stern addressed how to decide on the priorities for structural
conditionalities. He said that the selection should be guided by two prin-
ciples that follow from the objective of poverty reduction: (a) achieving
growth, and (b) giving poor people a chance to participate in growth. The
growth perspective draws attention to conditions that aﬀect the investment
climate—macro stability, governance issues including bureaucratic harass-
ment, administrative issues, the ﬁnancial sector, and so on. The participa-
tion perspective draws attention to issues such as education and public
health. Together “these two ways of looking at [structural conditionality]
should help us construct a focus that I think all of us would agree that the
Bank could do with,” said Stern. Feldstein asked Stern if he sees that social
and institutional conditionality—for instance improving schools in a poor
developing country—as helpful in resolving the current crisis, preventing
future crises, or making the country in question a better place. Stern an-
swered that this would help over the long term to reduce poverty. Feldstein
followed up by asking if this condition would be in the two-page document
held by the country director listing the conditions for getting assistance. To
this Sternreplied that the purpose of a condition would be made clear in the
strategy document that lies behind the condition, adding that what should
be in the two-page document is that social programs be protected in the ad-
justments that come in crises.
Larry Summers made three points. First, drawing on his experience with
the Mexican rescue package, he said that he has reluctantly concluded that
collateral for loans from the international ﬁnancial institutions does not
oﬀer a workable substitute for conditionality. Arranging for collateral is a
vastly more complicated business than almost anyone who writes about it
supposes, he said. Moreover, if good collateral is available, it ought to be
available to private-sector lenders. He said that the confusion on this issue
reached its “apex in the Meltzer Commission’s suggestion that local cur-
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lateral].”
Second, he sees a lot of “potential for mischief” in World Bank–IMF co-
operation on conditionality. Those who like the idea of structural condi-
tionality but dislike IMF mission creep support this idea, he said. However,
he sees the potential for a proliferation of conditions and delay as both in-
stitutions seek to have their priorities included. The other possibility is that
the World Bank won’t provide much money in the time of a crisis because it
doesn’t want to be seen as a “money pump,” with the result that the struc-
tural element will be lost from the program.
Finally, on Indonesia, he said that, although mistakes were made, it was
not an obvious failure of wisdom to trust President Suharto’s economic
leader of thirty years for guidance on what to include in the program. Re-
sponding to Paul Keating’s description of excessive and misplaced condi-
tionality, Summers said that the hard question is what to do when the gov-
ernment leader is transferring substantial funds to his family and friends.
This takes on special importance when one is transferring one’s own tax-
payers’ money to the country. He said that the critics should set out a coun-
terfactual history of what they would have had the Fund do and how they
think things would have worked out.
Domingo F. Cavallo said the Fund and World Bank will never get good
results if they try to impose structural policies. He said the only way to im-
plement reforms in a country is to rely on the political and economic lead-
ership in the country to carry them out, so the Fund and World Bank
should be looking for opportunities to support good reforms.
John Crowsaid that consideration should also be given to the World Bank
reviews and IMF consultation papers that come before a crisis. If an insti-
tution is to impose structural conditions at the time of a crisis, it needs to
have been involved in consultations about the country beforehand.
Arminio Fraga said that in a crisis the Fund should worry about crisis
management, and only crisis management. He said nothing should be done
to hurt the main objective. On letting legitimate governments add things to
the program, he said such additions should be allowed, but kept general.
Responding to the criticisms of Paul Keating and others, Jeﬀrey Frankel
oﬀered an additional defense of what he termed “enhanced conditionality.”
In Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand, there has been a movement toward
democracy. He said we told civil-society types in the past that globalization
would lead to growth and growth would lead to political liberalization.
However, it was not clear what the mechanism would be. The mechanism
in East Asia in the 1990s turned out to be ﬁnancial liberalization plus crisis
plus conditionality. The IMF did not set out deliberately to overturn any
governments, and to do so would of course have been an unacceptable vio-
lation of countries’ sovereignty. However, in the Korean election of No-
vember 1997, due to the ﬁnancial crisis, the incumbent president was de-
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man who was willing and able to accept the need for reform. President
Suharto in Indonesia was arguably brought down in 1998 by the combina-
tion of structural conditionality in the IMF program and his own unwill-
ingness to curb his family’s economic interests. In each of these countries, a
side eﬀect of the crisis was a peaceful step in the direction of democracy.
This political pattern is not in itself a good argument for undergoing a ﬁ-
nancial crisis. However, it belies the argument that IMF conditionality
works to undermine the forces of democracy in the victim countries.
Charles Dallara pointed out that the inclusion of structural elements in
IMF programs really began “gathering steam” in the 1980s. On the issue of
the appropriateness of more recent conditionality, he said he agreed with
Timothy F. Geithner that in today’s world of free capital markets the inter-
national institutions must be concerned with issues such as strengthening
financial sectors and addressing corporate governance. This follows from
the Fund’s fundamental concern with restoring a sustainable balance-
of-payments position. In today’s capital markets, restoring confidence re-
quires that the international institutions address the concerns of interna-
tional debt and equity investors. Conﬁdence depends to a signiﬁcant degree
on issues such as the strength of the financial sector and minority share-
holder rights. However, Dallara is not convinced that, just because there
needs to be a comprehensive approach, it all should be part of Fund condi-
tionality. He said the lack of an integrated approach utilizing the World
Bank, the regional development banks, the Bank for International Settle-
ments, and the Basel committee is one reason why there has been so much
Fund mission creep. Bringing about this integration requires a “more bru-
tal approach toward managing these institutions, and a more consistent
shareholder attitude,” he said. Without this, the Fund will be pushed to ad-
dress issues fundamental to restoring conﬁdence while being criticized for
having too many conﬂicting objectives and lacking necessary staﬀexpertise.
David Liptonargued that we need a realistic conception of program own-
ership. He said it is a mistake to think that there must be broad agreement
across the political spectrum. “If we had settled for what the Korean gov-
ernment was interested in doing on December 2 [1997], we would have had
no basis for going forward,” he said. Regarding what should be part of a
fund program, Lipton said that whatever is essential for restoring conﬁ-
dence has to be included. He recalled that the Korean government had re-
sisted many of the demands for structural reform, including, for example,
foreign ownership of banks. He added that we should judge these elements
by whether they “helped to give a sense that Korea was going to head in a
direction that would make it stable.” Turning to Indonesia, he said that the
Fund should not be criticized for including too many structural elements,
but it should be criticized for “losing sight of the centrality of monetary pol-
icy.” From November 1997 through February 1998 large liquidity credits
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money being given away to cronies,” Lipton explained. Lipton concluded
by saying that the program has to “add up to be convincing, especially in a
panic.” Conditions should not be disqualiﬁed from consideration because
they take a long time to have an eﬀect or are fundamentally about eﬃciency.
What is important, he said, is that these are seen as important ﬁrst steps in
useful directions.
On the issue of conditionality, Edwin Trumanstrongly agreed with David
Lipton when he said that conditionality should be seen as a package. Tru-
man said it is sometimes diﬃcult to determine at the time what the “essen-
tial elements” of a credible package are. One reason is that the audience is
varied: domestic residents, domestic leaders, foreign lenders, international
ﬁnancial markets, international institutions, and foreign oﬃcials who must
authorize positive votes on programs in the international ﬁnancial institu-
tions. Truman noted that Guillermo Ortiz referred to U.S. insistence in
early 1995 that the Bank of Mexico modify its previous practice of releas-
ing information on its reserves only three times a year and adopt a policy of
regular releases at least monthly. Larry Summers referred to the insistence
that the Thai authorities reveal at the end of August 1997 the extent of their
uncovered forward position. Truman was involved in both of these
episodes. In the Mexican case, the Federal Reserve had long been troubled
by the Bank of Mexico’s policy. Along with the treasury, in early January
1995, the Federal Reserve conditioned access by the Bank of Mexico to the
use of a drawing on the Federal Reserve’s swap lines on such a commitment.
It took the Bank of Mexico an entire weekend to agree. This agreement was
important not only on substantive grounds (although some might argue
that by itself it was trivial), but also because the action by the Bank of Mex-
ico also helped to restore the Bank of Mexico’s credibility in the eyes of the
U.S. authorities. Essentially the same argument applied in the Thai situa-
tion. The central bank of Thailand had lost credibility with the Federal Re-
serve, and several other (but not all major) central banks, because of the
way it had built up its forward exposure in secret. From this perspective, the
credibility of the Thai package was enhanced by the central bank’s reluctant
agreement to reveal its forward position. These actions may not have been
important to all observers or oﬃcials, but they were in each instance key to
Federal Reserve support.
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